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PUBLIC LAWS AND PRIVATE LAWMAKERS
KIMBERLY N. BROWN*
ABSTRACT

The Obama Administration's "Clean Power Plan" for addressing
industrialcarbon emissions is controversialas a matter of environmental
policy. It also has important constitutional implications. The rule was
initially crafted not by officers or employees of the Environmental
Protection Agency, but by two private lawyers and a scientist with
industry ties. Private parties operate extra-constitutionally, and no
existing legal doctrine tethers constitutionalscrutiny to the nature of the
power delegated to them. The nondelegation doctrine applies to
delegations by Congress-not to agencies' subdelegations of legislative
power to private parties. The other doctrinal lens for reviewing
rulemaking by entities other than Congress--ChevronU.S.A. v. National
Resources Defense Council, Inc. and its progeny-is equally blind to
subdelegations of policymaking authority to parties that function beyond
the boundaries of the Constitution. This Article takes up the issue of
private rulemaking, and argues that its inescapable constitutional
implications warrant a stronger nondelegation doctrine and a more
nuanced approach to Chevron that emphasizes public accountability,
legitimacy, transparency, and rational decision-making over notions of
agency prerogative.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A., Cornell; J.D.,
University of Michigan. Thanks to Michele Gilman and Dionne Koller for comments on prior drafts of
this Article, and to Adeen Postar, Laura Gagne, Maria lliadis, and Christian Noble for valuable
research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION

In what The New York Times called "Mr. Obama's boldest step in
using his executive authority to halt the warming of the planet," the
President in June of 2014 proposed a regulation designed to substantially
cut carbon emissions from power plants over the next 15 years.' He
unveiled the final rule on August 3, 2015.2 With major implications for the
global fight 3to stall climate change, the rule was swiftly assailed as
"unrealistic.", Twenty-four states and a private coal company have
challenged the EPA's rule in federal court.4 The EPA's "Clean Power
1. Coral Davenport & Peter Baker, Taking Page From Health Care Act, Obama Climate Plan
Relies on States, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/03/us/politics/obamaepa-rule-coal-carbon-pollution-power-plants.html (describing criticisms of proposed rule); David
Jackson, Obama to Reveal Planfor Cutting Greenhouse-GasEmissions, USA TODAY (Aug. 2, 2015,
5:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/02/obama-administration-reveal-emissionsregulations-plan/31012963/.
2. Colleen McCain Nelson & Amy Harder, Obama Announces Rule to Cut Carbon Emissions
from Power Plants, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2015, 7:33 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/obamaannounces-rule-to-cut-carbon-emissions-from-power-plants- 1438627158.
3. William O'Keefe, The EPA's Clean Power Plan, Impractical and Unrealistic, THE HILL
(Aug. 6, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/energy-environment/250393-theepas-clean-power-plan-impractical-and-unrealistic.
4. Cole Mellino, 24 States Sue Obama Over Clean Power Plan, ECOWATCH (Oct. 24, 2015,
10:18 AM), http://ecowatch.com/2015/10/24/clean-power-plan-lawsuits/.
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Plan" ("CPP") also raises a separation of powers problem. When private
parties-here, two lawyers, a scientist, and a prominent environmental
action group-craft regulatory policy, 5 is the final rule governed by the
same constitutional norms that apply to lawmaking conducted exclusively
by government actors?
To be sure, section 111 (d) of the Clean Air Act ("CAA") gives the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") the legal authority to issue the
CPP. 6 In Chevron US.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council,
Inc., the Court famously addressed the separation of powers implications
of Congress's delegation of rulemaking authority in the CAA, holding that
the EPA's interpretation of ambiguous statutory language-not that of the
courts-receives deference. Chevron thus made clear that, despite the
mandate of Article I, Congress has the constitutional authority to hand off
its legislative baton to federal agencies with impunity.
In bearing the heavy imprint of private influence, however, the CPP
does not lie squarely within the realm of government action. If public,
private, and quasi-public actions were plotted on a constitutional
continuum-with acts of the President at one end and those of purely
private parties at the other-the CPP would fit somewhere between those
poles.8 The question then becomes whether the constitutional rationales for
Chevron deference apply with equal force when the private sector engages
in legislative rulemaking on the President's behalf, as with the CPP. This
question inevitably invokes consideration of a related doctrine that
preceded Chevron: nondelegation.
The nondelegation doctrine is a Lockean notion that is fundamental to
the separation of powers. 9 In theory, nondelegation ensures that
policymaking resides in the branch of government that is most responsive
to popular will. It evolved in response to two kinds of delegations of
legislative power: delegations to federal agencies and delegations to the
private sector. Since the doctrine's post-New Deal heyday, the Court has
consistently deemed delegations of legislative authority to federal agencies

5. See Coral Davenport, Taking Oil Industry Cue, Environmentalists Drew Emissions Blueprint,
N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2Ol4/07/07/us/how-environmentalists-drewblueprint-for-obama-emissions-rule.htm I? r=0.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2014); What EPA is Doing, U.S. EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/carbonpollution-standards/what-epa-doing#overview (last updated Feb. 29, 2016).
7. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
8. See generally Kimberly N. Brown, Government by Contract and the Structural Constitution,
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 491, 507-12 (2011) (arguing that public-private relationships fall on a
constitutional continuum).
9. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive, 12 U.
PA. J.CONST. L. 251, 254-55 (2010).
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constitutional so long as Congress includes an "intelligible principle" in
the enabling statute to guide the exercise of agency discretion.' 0 With
Chevron, the Court effectively reversed course, enhancing agencies'
discretion to make laws pursuant to vague legislative mandates-at the
expense of de novo judicial review.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's sanctioning of Congress's
authority to delegate its legislative power to the executive branch (and, for
that matter, the private sector), constitutional doctrine says nothing about
agencies' authority to subdelegate the same legislative powers to private
parties. Because the Constitution does not restrict private behavior,
rulemaking sheds its constitutional character when non-federal actors
conduct it." Thus, whereas congressional attempts to delegate legislative
power trigger constitutional scrutiny, agency attempts to delegate
rulemaking authority do not. Such a paradox-that important
constitutional values come into play only when Congress attempts to
privatize government, and not when agencies do--flies in the face of over
a century of separation of powers doctrine. 12 It makes little sense for the
Supreme Court to wrestle with line drawing around shared governmental
powers if the question can be so easily nullified by a contract handing off
rulemaking powers to an extra-constitutional, private actor.
This Article considers executive branch outsourcing of legislative
power to private parties, and argues that its inescapable constitutional
implications warrant a stronger nondelegation doctrine and a more
nuanced approach to Chevron that emphasizes public accountability,
legitimacy, transparency, and rational decisionmaking over notions of
agency prerogative. The Chevron doctrine-like nondelegation-is driven
by normative judgments as to which branch of government is best suited
to make policy; by any measure, biased private actors do not qualify.
Part I describes the private exercise of public power in practical terms.
It then situates the issue on a constitutional policymaking continuum. This
approach is offered as a substitute paradigm for the strict public/private
divide that currently drives constitutional doctrine. Whereas a handful of
baseline values for good government necessarily influence the exercise of
public power at the governmental end of the continuum, they do not color
the exercise of identical powers by actors at the private end of that
spectrum under current law.

10. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989).
I1.

See Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18 HASTINGS

CONST. L.Q. 587, 592-93 (1991).
12. See infra Part I.A (discussing the nondelegation doctrines).
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Part II explores the constitutional doctrine bearing on the anomaly
illustrated by the constitutional policymaking continuum: although the
constitutionality of Congress's delegation of legislative powers outside
Article I is addressed by the nondelegation and private delegation
doctrines, the constitutionality of agencies' delegation of the same power
beyond the confines of Article II are not covered by these or any other
constitutional theories. The other available lens for judicial review of such
delegations-Chevron and its progeny-similarly fails to recognize that
executive branch subdelegations of legislative power to private parties
frustrate the Court's justifications for deference to agency policymaking.
Part III argues that agency subdelegations of legislative power to the
private sector should be subjected to heightened separation of powers
scrutiny, not exempt from it. Currently, there is no statutory or doctrinal
framework governing how agencies craft policy in the initial drafts of
legislative rules. Nor does any law limit the private sector's influence on
that process. This Part posits that courts should recognize a private
subdelegation doctrine and expanded approach to Chevron step zero in
order to account for private sector rulemaking that is not authorized by
Congress in enabling legislation. Such a functional approach to agency
subdelegations of legislative power is consistent with the Court's
pragmatic stance on delegation. It would also foster normative values of
good government that underlie the structural Constitution, including public
accountability, transparency, legitimacy, and rational decisionmaking.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The terms "privatization" and "outsourcing"'' 3 cover a broad spectrum
of public-private relationships that exist across the federal government
infrastructure. Today, private contractors outnumber federal employees by
two to one,' 4 performing functions ranging from "the 'merely' advisory to
the full-fledged assumption of policy-making authority."' 15 Perhaps the
most common form of outsourcing is the traditional service contract,
whereby a private third party agrees to perform some function that the
government would otherwise perform for itself, such as routine building
13. See generally PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 2 n.4 (2007) (explaining that
"[p]rivatization and outsourcing [can] be used interchangeably" and that "outsourcing is defined in
terms of contracting-out government services within the United States").
14. Charles Kenny, Why Private Contractors Are Lousy at Public Services, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 28, 2013, 4:51 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-10-28/
outsourcing-can-be-a-lousy-altemative-to-govemment-run-services.
15. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551 (2000).
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maintenance. Outsourcing can take many other forms, including industry
deregulation, voucher use, government corporations, the sale of
government assets to the private sector, 16 and the infusion of market
principles into public sector employment. 17
Even less known and difficult to quantify is the extent to which the
government relies on private parties to perform public functions
informally-without any exchange of money or contractual agreements.
As Edward Snowden's leaks of classified information revealed, national
security and federal law enforcement agencies glean untold terabytes of
data from private corporations for the government's own surveillance
purposes.' 8 The government has also allowed factions of the private sector
to craft national energy and environmental policy.' 9 When this happens,
the Constitution does not apply to constrain the private exercise of public
governance-even though identical actions by government actors would
be subject to constitutional scrutiny. 0
This Part illustrates the arbitrary nature of the foregoing paradox by
situating private parties along a constitutional policymaking continuum
instead of within a wholly separate, extra-constitutional space. In
exercising federal functions, private parties become anatomically related
to government actors within a constitutional structure that leads all the
way to the President. Yet the normative values underlying the structural
Constitution-including accountability, transparency, legitimacy, and
16. See Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and PoliticalAccountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1507, 1519, 1525 (2001); Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization,Public-ization,and
Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 113-17 (2005); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Outsourcing
Criminal Prosecution?:The Limits of CriminalJustice Privatization,2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 266.
17. Jon D. Michaels, Privatization's Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1026 (2013); see also
generally JANINE R. WEDEL, SHADOW ELITE: HOW THE WORLD'S NEW POWER BROKERS UNDERMINE

DEMOCRACY, GOVERNMENT, AND THE FREE MARKET 74-75 (2009) (discussing ways in which "a host

of nongovernmental players do the government's work, often overshadowing government
bureaucracy, which sometimes looks like Swiss cheese: full of holes").
18. See Craig Timberg & Barton Gellman, NSA Paying U.S. Companies for Access to
Communications Networks, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
2
national-security/nsa-paying-us-companies-for-access-to-communications-networks/ 013/08/29/5641 a
_story.html.
4b6-l0c2-1 I e3-bdf6-e4fc677d94al
19. See Michael Abramowitz & Steve Mufson, Papers Detail Industry's Role in Cheney's
Energy Report, WASH. POST (July 18, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2007/07/17/AR2007071701987.html.
20. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369-70
(2003) ("A foundational premise of our constitutional order is that public and private are distinct
spheres, with public agencies and employees being subject to constitutional constraints while private
entities and individuals are not.").
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rational decisionmaking-do not readily apply to the full spectrum of
public-private relationships implicating the exercise of federal powers. 2'
A. The Issue: Agency Subdelegations of Legislative Power
Lawmaking is arguably "the most important power created for our
government by the Founders" because it is "linked to the will of the people
through the electoral process and other means., 22 Of course, Congress
routinely empowers agencies to implement statutes by promulgating rules
with the force of law. Agencies' rulemaking authority ultimately derives
from Congress's legislative power under Article I of the Constitution. 23 In
Yakus v. United States,24 the Supreme Court defined "[tlhe essentials of
the legislative function" as "the determination of... policy and its
formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct...
which conform to standards and will tend to further the policy which
Congress has established., 25 Because of its Article I origins, "a good case
can be made that rule making is the most important function that agencies
of government perform"-one that is potentially more significant than
26
congressional legislation in terms of volume, specificity, and immediacy.
With today's gridlocked Congress, the significance of rulemaking has
intensified, as lobbyists turn to more sophisticated methods for influencing
regulatory agencies.2 7 When the federal government outsources its
delegated rulemaking powers to the private sector, there is even greater
cause for constitutional concern because the rulemaking function loses its
constitutional bearings.

21. See Kimberly N. Brown, "We the People, " Constitutional Accountability, and Outsourcing
Government, 88 IND. L.J.1347, 1369, 1376 (2013); cf VERKUIL, supra note 13, at 81 (noting that

"[d]elegations of government authority to private hands . ..are decisions that potentially transfer
sovereignty" and "should come with strings attached that ensure fairness at the individual level and
accountability at the political level").
22. Scott R. Furlong & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest Group Participation in Rule Making: A
Decade of Change, 15 J.PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 353, 354 (2005).

23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States ....
").
24.

321 U.S. 414 (1944).

25. Id. at 424.
26. Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 22, at 354.
27. Id. at 360-61; see also Mary C. Dollarhide, Note, Surrogate Rule Making: Problems and
Possibilities Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1017, 1039 (1988)

("Lobbyists are able to anticipate rules before they are officially proposed by agencies and can work
fast to secure their interests via industrial compromises, self-regulation, or agency lobbying. Lobbyists,
therefore, have much greater potential for influencing the development of substantive rules than do
most public interest groups. This notion of agency courting is borne out by studies showing that public
participation routinely is exceeded by the lobbying efforts of regulated industries.").
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It is difficult to obtain a precise accounting of the amount and extent of
rulemaking activities that are being outsourced to the private sector today.
The central repository for federal procurement data indicates that it is
happening. 28 At least three private firms-Rulemaking Services, LLC, ICF
International ("ICF"), and The Regulatory Group, Inc. ("TRG")-are
ready examples. Tens of thousands of tax dollars have been awarded to
Rulemaking Services 29 for tasks that include "Regulatory Studies" and
"Policy Review/Development Services." 30 The company describes its staff
as "expert drafters" of "proposed rules, final rules, interim final rules,
notices, and other rulemaking documents for federal agencies."' 3I For the
Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA"), in particular, it provides "support
for all of VA's rulemaking activities, including drafting and reviewing
rulemaking documents, preparing VA responses to legislative proposals,
preparing legal opinions, and representing VA in litigation. 3 2 Rulemaking
Services attributes its "considerable success" to working "directly with
to produce documents that accurately reflect agency
agency officials
33
thinking."
For its part, ICF 34 offers "a full range of services to assist clients who
develop, promulgate, and implement regulations," including "clear and

28. See FPDS-NG FAQ, FED. PROCUREMENT DATA SYSTEM, https://www.fpds.gov/wiki/
index.php/FPDS-NG FAQ (last visted Oct. 30, 2015) (describing the federal contract data that must
be reported to the Federal Procurement Data System ("FPDS")).
29. See FPDS-NG ezSearch, FED. PROCUREMENT DATA SYSTEM, https://www.fpds.gov/
ezsearch/search.do?indexName=awardfull&templateName= 1.4.4&s=FPDSNG.COM&q=%22rulemak
ing+services+limited+liability+company/o22 (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
30. Id.
31. Rulemaking Services, LLC, RULEMAKING SERVICES, http://www.rulemakingservices.com/
index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). Numerous scholars have discussed how federal agencies
outsource rulemaking functions. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control over Access to the
Law: The Perplexing FederalRegulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737, 739
(2014) (discussing how thousands of regulatory standards are incorporated by reference in the Federal
Register or the Code of Federal Regulations and are available only by request to private standards
drafters at a nontrivial price); Paul R. Verkuil, The Wait is Over: Chevron as the Stealth Vermont
Yankee II, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 921, 928 (2007) ("The use of consultants to prepare rules for
review has become a common practice."); David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New
Administrative Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 63 (2013) (discussing the outsourcing of international
policymaking).
32. About Us, RULEMAKING SERVICES, http://www.rulemakingservices.com/about.htm (last
visited May 7, 2016).
33. Rulemaking Services, LLC, RULEMAKING SERVICES, http://www.rulemakingservices.com/
index.html (last visited May 7, 2016).
34. The president of Rulemaking Services, LLC previously worked at ICF. About Us,
RULEMAKING SERVICES, http://www.rulemakingservices.com/about.htm (last visited May 7, 2016). He
is also a former director of the office of regulatory law in the Office of General Counsel at the U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs. Thomas 0. Gessel, The Frustrationof Informal Rulemaking, READ
PERIODICALS (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.readperiodicals.com/201104/2317013711 .html.
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precise drafting, defensible and transparent analysis, . . and balancing
certainty and predictability with the need to promote innovation. 35 ICF
claims to have expertise reviewing new legislation; analyzing regulatory
issues and options; estimating the economic, environmental, and business
impacts of proposed regulations; "supporting the development of proposed
and final rulemakings"; summarizing and analyzing public comments on
agencies' behalf; facilitating public involvement in the rulemaking
process; developing "implementation plans, communications strategies,
and training and outreach programs" for
federal clients; and "preparing
36
retrospective analyses of existing rules."
Located in Arlington, Virginia, TRG has provided similar services to
federal agencies since 1980, including drafting notices of proposed
rulemaking and final rules, analyzing public comments, drafting agency
37
guidance, and training agency employees on "regulation writing."
Assuming TRG's website accurately represents the work it performs for
federal agencies, it is hard to see it as anything other than a private arm of
the federal regulatory apparatus that derives its lawmaking powers from
Congress.3 8
The private sector's influence on environmental policymaking has
grabbed national headlines in recent years. In November 2010, the
National Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") and three private sector
strategists by the names of David Doniger, David Hawkins, and Daniel
Lashof began drafting a carbon emissions policy "that was aimed at
slashing planet-waming carbon pollution from the nation's coal-fired
power plants., 39 Doniger and Hawkins are private lawyers formerly
employed by the EPA; Lashof is "a climate scientist who is a fixture on
35. Strategy, Policy Analysis, + Regulatory Development, ICF INT'L, http://www.icfi.com/
services/strategy-policy-analysis-regulatory-development (last visited Feb. 26, 2015).
36. Id. Among its long list of federal contracts, ICF provides "Other Management Support
Services" for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. FPDS-NG ezSearch, FED. PROCUREMENT DATA
SYSTEM, https://www.fpds.gov/ezsearchlsearch.do?s=FPDSNG.COM&q=rulemaking+PIID%3A%22
NRCDR0308061%22&indexName=awardfull&templateName=1.4.4 (last visited Dec. 2, 2014).
37. About the Regulatory Group, Inc., THE REG. GROUP, INC., http://www.regulationwriters.
com/about us (last visited Nov. 23, 2015).
38. Its clients have included the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health and
Human Services, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of
Interior, the Department of Transportation, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the General
Services Administration-as well as numerous sub-agencies, such as the Transportation Security
Adminsitration, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Federal Aviation Administration.
Consulting Clients, THE REG. GROUP, INC., http://www.regulationwriters.com/consultingclients (last
visited Mar. 29, 2016).
39. Davenport, supra note 5.

624
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Capitol Hill" and chief operating officer of an environmental super PAC.4 °
From 2010 to 2012, the three men worked with a team of experts to
compose a 110-page proposal that sought to effectuate carbon emissions
goals by "set[ting] different limits for each state. 4 1 In late 2012, they
presented their completed proposal to a number of "state regulators,
the
electric utilities, [and] executives. ' ' 2 Mr. Doniger also "briefed...
43
E.P.A. and Mr. Obama's senior climate adviser at the time.",
In June of 2013, six months after the group circulated their proposal,
President Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum directing the EPA to
issue regulations addressing carbon pollution from existing power plants
upon "direct engagement with ... leaders in the power sector, labor

leaders, non-governmental organizations, other experts, tribal officials,
other stakeholders, and members of the public, on issues informing the
design of the program." 44 The memorandum specifically instructed the
EPA "to issue proposed [greenhouse gas] regulations, or guidelines ... for
...

existing power plants by no later than June 1, 2014," and "issue final

...

regulations, or guidelines ...

by no later than June 1, 2015.

4

In June

of 2014, the EPA proposed what is now known as the CPP, 46 a
controversial 650-page rule to curb power plant emissions under the
CAA;4 7 it was unveiled in final form in August of 2015.48
Because the proposed CPP incorporated key aspects of the draft
produced by the NRDC and its advisors, critics assailed it as enabling the
private sector to "craft[] regulatory policy for the E.P.A."4 9 Doniger,
Hawkins, and Lashof have been described "as seasoned and [as] well
connected as Washington's best-paid lobbyists because of their decades of

40. Id.
41. Id.

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Memorandum on Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,533 (July 1,
2013), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201300457/pdf/DCPD-201300457.pdf.

45. Id.
46. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); see also
generally Davenport & Baker, supra note 1 (describing the proposed regulation as allowing states to
choose from a menu of policy options rather than imposing a uniform standard for reducing power
plant carbon emissions).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2014).
48.

Jackson, supra note 1.

49. Davenport, supra note 5 (quoting Dallas Burtraw, an energy policy expert at Resources for
the Future, a Washington nonprofit, and Laura Sheehan, a spokesperson for the American Coalition for
Clean Coal Electricity, a lobbying group).
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experience and the relationships they formed in the capital." 5 ° For its part,
the NRDC is "one of the country's most influential environmental
groups.",5' In 2009, it had "at least a half-dozen [of its] former employees"
seated in "prime government positions tasked with writing U.S. climate
and energy policies. 52 It has received nearly $2 million in grant funding
from the EPA since.53
In response to reporting by The New York Times,5 4 the House
Oversight and Government Reform Committee and Senate Environment
and Public Works Committee Republicans launched an investigation into
the NRDC's influence over the EPA, complaining that "NRDC's
unprecedented access to high-level EPA officials allowed it to influence
EPA policy decisions and achieve its own private agenda., 55 The
Republicans sought documents regarding the NRDC's involvement in
drafting the agency's proposed regulations for carbon emissions from
existing power plants.56 In October of 2014, lawmakers publicly released
emails from top EPA officials, including Administrator Gina McCarthy,
which evidenced NRDC's relationship with EPA dating back to 201157
two years before the agency opened up the rulemaking for public input.
In one exchange with Administrator McCarthy, David Doniger attached a
multi-page presentation showing that the CPP "would achieve reasonablecost reductions from the existing fossil power plant fleet on a continuing
50. Id. EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy rejected as "preposterous" any implication that EPA
staff "'just cut and pasted' NRDC's work 'and called it a day."' Erica Martinson, EPA Chief Pans New
York Times Story, POLITICO (July 10, 2014, 5:21 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2014/

07/epa-chief-pans-ny-times-story-191891.html#disqus_thread. A reporter who broke the story later
conceded that "[t]he task of writing [the regulatory] language [fell] chiefly on the shoulders of ... the
agency's senior counsel." Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Staff Struggling to Create Pollution Rule, N.Y.

TIMES (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/05/us/epa-staff-struggling-to-create-rule.
limiting-carbon-emissions.html?_r=0.
51.

Darren Samuelsohn, Environmental Policy: 'NRDC Mafia' Finding Homes on Hill, in EPA,

E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/stories/75217.
52. Id.
53. Press Release, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, House Oversight, Senate EPW
Launch Investigation into Improper NRDC Influence over EPA (Sept. 2, 2014), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/release/house-oversight-senate-epw-launch-investigation-improper-nrdcinfluence-epa/.
54. See Letter from H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform and S. Environment and Public
Works Comm. to Gina McCarthy, Administrator, U.S. EPA I (Sept. 2, 2014), available at
https: /oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Joint-LTE-to-EPA-RE-NRDC-9.2.1 4.pdf.
55. Id.

56. Id. at 3.
57. Coral Davenport, Republicans to Investigate Environmental Group's Influence on Carbon
Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/11/us/republicans-to-investigate-

environmental-groups-influence-on-carbon-rule.html?_r=0.
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basis. '58 McCarthy agreed to review it and schedule a time for Doniger to
brief her as, she reportedly commented, "I would never say no to a
meeting with you."'59
To be sure, the CPP went through multiple phases of agency review
before finding its way into the Federal Register. The EPA's analysts and
experts sought input from hundreds of groups, "including environmental
advocates, state regulators, electric utilities and the coal industry. 6 ° Under
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 61 the EPA was required to
consider the additional public input collected during the comment period.62
Thus, as Joseph Siegel has observed, the government "retain[ed] ultimate
authority to impose its own solutions using traditional processes., 63
Reviewing and responding to public comments on a rule drafted by the
private sector is substantively different from controlling the content of a
legislative rule-and thus the formulation of policy-from its inception,
however. When a private party crafts the legal basis for a rule, it is
impossible to know "whether this statutory interpretation represented a
position that the agency would have come to on its own-much less one
that embodied an application of the agency's putative legal expertise."'64
Moreover, a separation of powers concern arises when "the exercise of
public power, and the creation of public policy, [is conducted] by an entity
without democratic credentials or direct political accountability., 65 To be
sure, there is no clear dividing line between regulators' consideration of
legitimate on- or off-the-record lobbying and their offloading of
policymaking functions in a manner that is constitutionally suspect. But as
the CPP irregularities demonstrate, courts and lawmakers can no longer
58. Bruce Alpert, Sen. David Vitter: EPA Emails Show 'Cozy Relationship' with Environmental
Group, NOLA.COM (Oct. 14, 2014, 8:17 PM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/l0/

sen david vitter epa emails_sh.html.
59. Id.
60. Davenport, supra note 5.
61. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-596 (2014).
62. Id.§ 553. Executive Order 13563 also requires that, "[b]efore issuing a notice of proposed
rulemaking, each agency . . . shall seek the views of those who are likely to be affected, including
those who are likely to benefit from and those who are potentially subject to such rulemaking." Exec.
Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821, 3,822 (Jan. 18, 2011) (emphasis added).
63. Joseph A. Siegel, Collaborative Decision Making on Climate Change in the Federal
Government, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 257, 263 (2009); see also id at 261 (defining collaborative
decisionmaking as including processes "where agreement is sought and decisions are made with the
government" and noting that it is sometimes referred to as "stake-holder involvement, public
involvement, public participation, public-private partnership, deliberative democracy, constructive
engagement, and collaborative problem solving").
64. Robert Choo, Judicial Review of Negotiated Rulemaking: Should Chevron Deference Apply?,
52 RUTGERS L. REV. 1069, 1110 (2000).
65. Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 191 (2000).
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ignore the constitutional implications of private sector rulemaking. A new
paradigm for thinking about the relationship between the public and the
private sectors is needed to facilitate the development of law around this
overlooked issue.
B. A ConstitutionalPolicymaking Continuum
Because the Constitution only applies to state action,6 6 the
government's use of private sources to conduct its work evades the
doctrinal scrutiny that would otherwise operate to preserve normative
government values such as public
accountability, legitimacy, transparency,
67
decisionmaking.
rational
and
The primary means available for keeping private actors who exercise
public functions within constitutional constraints is the state action
doctrine.6 s In the words of the Supreme Court, the Fourteenth Amendment
"affords no shield" against private conduct, "no matter how unfair that
conduct may be.",69 As a consequence, the state action doctrine treats
private parties as government actors in suits brought by individual
plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief or damages for violations of their
constitutional rights. 70 For many reasons, securing a ruling that a private
actor is a state actor for purposes of constitutional liability is
extraordinarily difficult. 7 The Supreme Court itself has quipped that
"[w]hat is 'private' action and what is 'state' action is not always easy to
66. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984).
67. See Jack M. Balkin, Respect- Worthy: Frank Michelman and the Legitimate Constitution, 39
TULSA L. REV. 485, 486 (2004) (discussing various theories that account for why the Constitution

ensures legitimacy or "respect-worthiness"); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the
Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 42 (1995) (discussing accountability to the electorate as a "key

consideration" underlying the Constitution's design); Doni Gewirtzman, Our Founding Feelings:
Emotion, Commitment, and Imagination in Constitutional Culture, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 623, 626

(2009) (arguing that the Constitution's drafters had "a strong preference for rational, deliberate
decision making over making choices based on feelings or intuition" that was widely accepted in
contemporary culture); Katherine Clark Harris, Note, The Statement and Account Clause: A Forgotten
Constitutional Mandate for Federal Reporting, 32 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 505, 513 (2014) (observing

that "Madison also held the strong belief that transparency was the primary means by which the
federal government is held accountable to the people").
68. Metzger, supra note 20, at 1410.
69. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988); see also generally Sheila S. Kennedy, When
Is Private Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, II GEO.
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 203, 209 (2001)(discussing U.S CONST. amend. XIV, which extended the Bill of

Rights to the States).
70. Metzger, supra note 20, at 1367.
71. See id. at 1421 (observing that "current state action doctrine is significantly underinclusive
and ill-equipped to identify and thereby control private exercises of government power").
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determine. 72 Rather, a court's role is to "sift[] facts and weigh[]
circumstances" in individual cases, 73 which leaves a dizzying array of
outcomes with few common threads.
Moreover, the state action doctrine places an agency's decision to hand
off government functions to private parties beyond constitutional scrutiny.
It approaches judicial review of public-private partnerships from the
vantage point of the private sector, to which structural constitutional
norms do not apply. A case for state action begins with the assumption
that a person or entity exercising government power is purely private. The
doctrine asks whether, by assuming duties under the government's control,
the actor morphs from private to public status. 74 In theory, government
control over a private actor can become so strong that it transforms into a
state actor encumbered by constitutional liability. In the majority of cases,
government powers delegated to private parties are exercised extraconstitutionally because the test for state action is so difficult to satisfy. As
a result, norms of constitutional structure do not apply to constrain private
actors' exercise of government functions.75
By contrast, the law governing Congress's ability to create quasiprivate entities with government powers begins from the vantage point of
the government actor operating within the boundaries of the
a
76
Constitution. Cases addressing the constitutionality of independent
agencies inescapably contend with principles of proper constitutional
design.77 If an entity is created as part of the legislative process, it cannot
shed its public status under the Constitution-regardless of congressional
attempts to decrease the level of government influence over it. For
72. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966); see also Louis Michael Seidman, The State
Action Paradox, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 379, 391 (1993) ("No area of constitutional law is more
confusing and contradictory than state action.").
73. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
74. Gillian Metzger summarizes the state action doctrine as having two prongs:
[F]irst, whether "the [challenged] deprivation ... [was] caused by the exercise of some right
or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person
for whom the State is responsible"; and second, whether "the party charged with the
deprivation ... [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor."
Metzger, supra note 20, at 1412 (alterations in original) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). Professor Metzger notes that, because the first prong is easily satisfied, the key
step is the second, which is "often alternatively characterized as determining whether 'there is a
sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action."' Id. at 1412 & n.149 (quoting
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,52 (1999)).
75. See Brown, supra note 8, at 507-12.
76. See id.
77. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1988) (assessing the constitutionality of
the independent counsel statute under Article 11).
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example, although Amtrak was legislatively established as a for-profit
corporation, the Supreme Court rejected Congress's attempt to relieve
"what the Constitution regards as the Government" of its constitutional
obligations by simply deeming Amtrak "private" in the enabling statute.78
The Court would be similarly hard-pressed under prevailing law to
sanction a congressional attempt to create a private consulting corporation
and give it full power to implement a statute extra-constitutionally. In the
wake of the 2001 Enron and WorldCom scandals, Congress created an
independent agency with a novel structure-the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB")-and gave it primary
responsibility for devising and enforcing auditing standards for the
accounting industry. 79 The PCAOB promulgates rules; inspects and
investigates firms for violations of federal securities laws; imposes
censures, suspensions, and monetary fines; and enjoys subpoena authority,
official immunity from liability, and privileges from third party
discovery. 80 Yet Congress exempted the PCAOB from the definition of
"agency" for purposes of the APA, 8 1 empowered the SEC-not the
President-to appoint and remove the PCAOB's five members, and
authorized removal by the SEC only "for good cause shown" after a
hearing on the record.82 Congress also made the PCAOB uniquely
independent of legislative pressures by allowing it to fund itself through
the collection of fees,83 to set its own budget, 84 and to afford its members a
private sector pay85scale with salaries that substantially exceed that of the
President himself.
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board,86 the Supreme Court struck down a portion of the statute 87 that
rendered the PCAOB subject to removal for cause by the SEC. It held that
78. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995).
79. See Stephen Labaton, A Push to Fix the Fix on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.eom/2006/l 2/17/weekinreview/171abaton.html? r-O (describing events leading up
to the creation of the PCAOB).
80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(c), 7215 (2014); see also generally Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo
with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and ltsPublic/PrivateStatus, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975
(2005).

81. 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (b) ("The Board shall not be an agency or establishment of the United States
.").
The APA applies only to entities that constitute an "agency," which it defines as "authorit[ies]
of the Government of the United States." 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2014).
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 721 l(e)(6), 7217.
83. See id. § 7219(c)(I) (providing for the collection of "accounting support fees").
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. § 7211(c)(7).
See id. §§7211 (f)(4),
7219.
561 U.S. 477 (2010).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 93:615

the statute's creation of "dual for-cause limitations on the removal of88
Board members contravene the Constitution's separation of powers,
because the President is unable to "hold the Commission fully accountable
for the Board's conduct, to the same extent that he may hold the
Commission accountable for everything else that it does."8 9 Had Congress
instead authorized the SEC to devise standards for the accounting industry,
and the SEC subsequently hired a private party to craft them, the SEC's
relationship with that private party would not have triggered anything
approaching the constitutional scrutiny that the PCAOB received. 90 For the
same policy reasons that the Court found the PCAOB's structure
insupportable, it should develop constitutional doctrine to address this
blind spot, as well.
To illustrate the paradox, suppose a private consulting group with
expertise in environmental policy (call it "PCC") contracts with the EPA
to craft a regulation under the CAA to cut carbon emissions from power
plants over the next 15 years. Although PCC's initial contract with the
EPA only covers the drafting of a notice of proposed rulemaking
("NPRM"), the EPA later broadens the scope of work to include
solicitation and analysis of public comments; private meetings with
lobbyists, members of Congress, and public interest groups to solicit input;
revisions to the NPRM; and drafting of the final rule. The PCC is also
responsible for ensuring the EPA has complied with the myriad other
federal statutes that encumber notice and comment rulemaking under the
APA, 91 such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 92 the Paperwork Reduction
Act, 93 the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 94 the Small Business
Fairness Act, 95 and numerous Executive Orders
Regulatory Enforcement
96
affecting rulemaking.
PCC's scope of work would likely violate guidelines for the
competitive outsourcing of federal jobs, which the Office of Management

88.

Free Enter.Fund, 561 U.S. at 492.

89. Id. at 496.
90. See Metzger, supra note 20, at 1400 ("A fundamental tenet of constitutional law posits an
'essential dichotomy' between public and private, with only public or government actors being subject
to constitutional restraints.").
91. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2014).
92. Id. §§ 601-612.
93. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3521 (2014).
94. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1571 (2014).
95.

Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 864 (1996).

96. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R.
323 (1986) (requiring OMB oversight of the regulatory process through its Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs); see also 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3521.
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and Budget issued in 1976. 97 Circular A-76 forbids the outsourcing of
"inherently governmental" functions, which it defines to include activities
that determine, protect, or advance US interests by military action or
contract management; that significantly affect the life, liberty, or property
of private persons; or that exert ultimate control over the disposition of
federal property. 98 But the EPA could erroneously classify PCC's work
under Circular A-76, and judicial review of that decision is largely
unavailable. 99 And because Congress did not create PCC, there would be
no judicial review of its EPA contract for compliance with the separation
of powers and related principles of constitutional structure.
The paradox created by the foregoing scenario-that important
constitutional values come into play only when Congress attempts to
privatize government, and not when an agency does-stems from the
futile line-drawing that underlies prevailing doctrine as to the
Constitution's scope. A better and more realistic approach would
recognize that the public and private sectors intersect in myriad and
complex ways, and that the Constitution's relevance should not hinge on
which branch of government-Congress or the executive-established the
public-private partnership in question. In fact, given that Congress has the
constitutional power to "make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution ... [all] powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department
or officer thereof,"' 00 one would expect that its decisions about what kind
of entity is best situated to implement its legislative mandates would
receive relatively less-not more stringent-constitutional scrutiny.
The recognition that government lies along a constitutional continuum
and not along a sharp public-private divide is of immense practical
importance. In addition to independent agencies and wholly-owned
government corporations, the federal government umbrella includes
numerous other entities, such as corporations partly-owned by the federal
government, federally-chartered corporations that are privately owned,' 0
97. Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 310, 326 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009)
[hereinafter "GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT"] (citing OMB, Circular A-76, Attachment A, Part B).
98. Verkuil, supra note 97, at 326. An agency's decision of what is "inherently governmental" is
effectively not reviewable. VERKUIL, supra note 13, at 126. Although an "interested party" can lodge a
legal challenge, Article Ill standing problems can preclude judicial review.
99. See VERKUIL, supra note 13, at 128.
100. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
101. Beermann, supra note 16, at 1517; see also generally Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles,
Established by Practice. The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L.
REV. 11 1, 1228-31 (2000) ("While they share similar characteristics with the independent agencies
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government-sponsored enterprises ("GSEs") like Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, '0 2 self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") such as the New York
Stock Exchange, 10 3 as well as numerous offices, boards, commissions, and
foundations with all different sorts of government ties.' °4 This impressive
collection of quasi-government establishments is characterized by varying
degrees of executive branch control and accountability; while GSEs are
not subject to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), for example,
certain-but not all-federal corporations are treated as agencies within
the meaning of the APA. 0 5
If the various arrangements by which the many public, private, and
quasi-public actors exercising governmental power are plotted on a
constitutional graph or continuum rather than within separate public and
private spaces, it becomes immediately evident that no crisp line exists
between the public and the private spheres. To be sure, cabinet-level
agencies would reside on one end of this continuum and purely private
actors with no government affiliations on the other. But between those
corporations'] corporate structure is the feature that sets them apart from the independent
agency.").
102. A government sponsored enterprise "is a federally chartered, privately owned, privately
managed financial institution that has only specialized lending and guarantee powers and that bondmarket investors perceive as implicitly backed by the federal government." Richard Scott Camell,
Handling the Failureof a Government-SponsoredEnterprise,80 WASH. L. REV. 565, 570 (2005).
103. Private entities self-regulate through "industrial codes and product standards," which
agencies incorporate in government regulations. Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government
Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389, 401 (2003). For its part, the SEC has repeatedly stated that "as a
general matter, self-regulatory organizations .. .are not state actors and thus are not subject to the
Constitution's due process requirements." In the Matter of Timothy H. Emerson, Jr. for Review of
Action Taken by FINRA, Exchange Act Release No. 60,328 (July 17, 2009), at I1;see also William 1.
Friedman, The Fourteenth Amendment's Public/PrivateDistinction Among Securities Regulators in
the U.S. Marketplace-Revisited, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 727, 746 (2004) (noting that
"courts have acknowledged the government's symbiotic relationship with the SROs in their joint
regulation of the securities markets; and yet they have been unwilling to extend the protections of the
Constitution to parties adversely affected by the SROs' activities").
104. Breger & Edles, supra note 101, at 1199; see also generally id. at 1228-34 (discussing
government corporations and GSEs generally).
105. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2014); Breger & Edles, supra note 101, at 1229-30; see also Shapiro, supra
note 103, at 390.
...[public
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poles lies a vast array of "quasi" entities. 106 A rough illustration of such a
normative continuum is as follows:' 0 7
government

Prsiet!
APresident/

Imembers/
independent

Article 11

cabinet heads/
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Fprivate
federal
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agenciesfunctions
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This visual depiction of the relationship between public and private
actors engaged in identical federal regulatory work demonstrates that all
such actors bear a relationship to the structural Constitution. The
separation of powers exists to protect individual liberty, which remains at
risk if the power of the people is exercised by biased, unaccountable
individuals. There is no point along the continuum at which the public
nature of the functions performed magically disappears or becomes

constitutionally insignificant. The continuum thus necessitates a realistic
assessment of whether normative values of good government-grounded
in the separation of powers-are preserved in the array of quasi-private
governmental structures that dot the federal government today. It also
highlights a blind spot in prevailing constitutional doctrine-one that

106. In his dissenting opinion in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, Justice Breyer emphasized that
federal statutes broadly delegate a host of powers and responsibilities to government officials and that
"[t]hose statutes create a host of different organizational structures." Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 520-21 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). He explained:
[S]ometimes they vest it in multimember or multiagency task groups; sometimes they vest it
in commissions or advisory committees made up of members of more than one branch;
sometimes they divide it among groups of departments, commissions, bureaus, divisions, and
administrators; and sometimes they permit state or local governments to participate as well.
Id. at 521 (citations omitted). In making the point that "it is not surprising that administrative units
comes in many different shapes and sizes," Justice Breyer did not mention that such administrative
units increasingly include private companies. Id.
107. The point here is to illustrate the continuum concept, not commit to a particular order or
comprehensiveness of relationships. See Brown, supra note 8, at 510-11, 511 n. 112; cf Steven L.
Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 319, 324 (2002) (describing a continuum of
rulemaking that is classified by the amount of governmental participation involved, with one end
reflecting "rules of law originated and put into force by sovereign governments" and "rules that are
adopted entirely by private actors" at the other).
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shrouds the private sector in an intellectually corrupt veil of extraconstitutionality.° 8
C. Baseline Values
So far, this Article has argued that the Court's treatment of private
parties as per se operating outside the scope of the Constitutionregardless of the governmental nature of their work-leaves unrealized
important normative values of good government. This Subpart spells out
what some of those values are-to wit, accountability, transparency,
legitimacy, and rational decisionmaking-and explains how, in contrast to
their federal counterparts, private actors exercising government power
systematically evade them.
1. Accountability
A central component of governance is political accountability. To be
accountable is to be answerable, explainable, and reckoning for one's
actions.10 9 Under the Constitution, government accountability presumes

that the source of federal power-the people-must have some say in how
it is exercised. 1 0 The Framers' decision to create a unitary executive
underscores the importance of accountability to the public in the
Constitution's structure.1"' Madison explained in Federalist No. 37 that
"[t]he genius of republican liberty seems to demand ... not only that all
power should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted [sic]
'1 12
For government
with it should be kept in dependence on the people."

108. See Brown, supra note 8, at 511-12.
109.

WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 50 (1989).

110. See Brown, supra note 21, at 1370.
111. Memorandum Opinion for the General Counsels of the Federal Government: The
Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 135
(1996) [hereinafter Constitutional Separation of Powers].
112. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 181 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). Public
accountability has been described further as encompassing the:
sense of individual responsibility and concern for the public interest expected from public
servants[,] ... the various institutional checks and balances by which democracies seek to
control the actions of the governments[,] ...the extent to which governments pursue the
wishes or needs of their citizens ... regardless of whether they are induced to do so through
processes of authoritative exchange and control[,] . . .[and] the public discussion between
citizens on which democracies depend ....
Richard Mulgan, 'Accountability':An Ever-Expanding Concept?, 78 PUB. ADMIN. 555, 556 (2000).
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actors, "the key accountability relationships.., are those between the
' 13
citizens and the holders of public office.""
Moreover, as Madison famously stated in Federalist No. 51, the system
of separated powers was designed so that "[a]mbition must be made to
counteract ambition."'" 14 Madison described the underlying "policy" of the
separation of powers as "divid[ing] and arrang[ing] the several offices in
such a manner as that each may be a check on the other."' 5 Because the
legislature posed a risk of amassing too much power, it was split into two
116
houses "on [the] ground that each House will keep the other in check."
Individual members of Congress do not always make decisions for the
good of the nation as a whole, and can become mired in internal politics
that prompt legislation to serve individual ends. Lawmaking by Congress
is checked through the presidential veto and judicial review. Although the
unitary President can act decisively without becoming enmeshed in
internal politics, he can also act arbitrarily, and as such his power is
limited to the veto, commanding armies, negotiating treaties, and
nominating public officials." 7
The Constitution does not create an administrative bureaucracy, and
unlike Congress, agencies occupy quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, and
executive postures without any direct electoral check." 8 Thus, numerous
scholars have occupied themselves with questions of accountability within
the administrative state." 19 The constitutional and statutory law bearing on
the attenuated political accountability for executive branch agencies,
moreover, is deep. In the New Deal era, the Supreme Court famously
thwarted congressional attempts to delegate its Article I legislative power
to the executive branch on the rationale that Congress had set "no criterion

113.

Mulgan, supra note 112, at 556.

114.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).

115.

Id.

116. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 63
(James Madison)).
117. See Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 305 (2009).
118. Executive Departments are mentioned in the Opinions Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2
("[The President] may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices ....
); see also id.
("[Executive] [a]ppointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
Law....").
119. See generally Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1747-50,
1754 (2009) (describing debate between presidential "unitarians" who "emphasize accountability as an
important constitutional principle" and others who believe that the Constitution "adopts a framework
of joint, rather than single or simple accountability" and analyzing the "major functional question
regarding the administrative state," in other words, "whether it permits end-runs around the
accountability protections that would apply were Congress or the other named branches performing the
activities delegated to it").
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to govern the President's course."120 Yet it swiftly established that
Congress has the constitutional authority to delegate its legislative power
to the executive branch so long as its enabling legislation includes an
"intelligible principle" to guide the exercise of discretion.12 1
For its part, Congress responded to public concern over the
accountability of New Deal agencies 122 by enacting the APA in 1946.23
The APA remains the primary statutory source for public disclosure,
public involvement in rulemaking, and judicial review of administrative
decision-making today. 124 William Funk explains that, like the
Constitution, the APA "does not indicate a rejection of the need for strong
government for the proper functioning of modern society, but rather1 25a
healthy disrespect for the motives and abilities of men placed in power.
The APA "uses procedural mechanisms to check the power granted," such
as mandatory notice of proposed rules and the solicitation and
consideration of public comments, "while not denying the need for the
power.' 26 Thus, much like the Constitution, the APA advances normative
values of good government, including accountability to the political
branches (and thus to the public), fairness, transparency, regularity,
expertise, and reasoned decisionmaking. 27 The statute has remained
largely untouched since its passage, with the Supreme Court taking up the
task of construing 28its provisions in a manner that effectuates these public
policy objectives.1
120. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1935); see also A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
121. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
122. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative ProcedureAct Emerges
from New Deal Politics,90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557, 1590-91 (1996).
123. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2014).
124. Id. The APA's basic purposes are (1) "[t]o require agencies to keep the public currently
informed of their organization, procedures and rules"; (2) "to provide for public participation in the
rule making process"; (3) "to prescribe uniform standards for the conduct of formal rulemaking [and
adjudication]"; and (4) "to restate the law of judicial review." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 9 (1947).

125. William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotation and the Public
Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 90 (1987) (calling the APA "a compromise
piece of legislation designed to constrain the discretion of agencies while legitimating their remaining
discretion through procedural regularity and judicial oversight").
126. Id.
127. Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron
Misconceives the Function ofAgencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 693 (2007).
128. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The APA and Regulatory Reform, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 81, 81-82
(1996) (noting that the APA "has proven to be remarkably durable").
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After a second wave of government expansion in the early 1970s, 29
government began to shift from bureaucratic administration to businesslike management, with private parties functioning as "the new agents of
the state."'' 30 In fiscal year 2016 alone, the federal government paid over
$113 billion to private contractors,13' which have been known to formulate
federal policy, interpret laws, administer foreign aid, manage nuclear
weapons sites, interrogate detainees, and control borders. 132 A new canon
of privatization scholarship emerged, with some commentators
"embrac[ing] self-regulation"' 33 and others decrying the privatization trend
as deeply problematic. 134
Privatization has triggered novel questions of "accountability, and the
extent to which delegation adequately constrains administrative action
within the rule of law.', 135 Yet unlike the law governing federal agencies,
constitutional doctrine has not kept apace with privatization. The postNew Deal Court struck down a number of statutory delegations of
legislative power to private hands, 136 only to later uphold legislation
authorizing private individuals to engage in regulatory efforts on the
rationale that public officials ultimately retained review authority., 37 The
129. R. Shep Melnick, The Conventional Misdiagnosis: Why "Gridlock" Is Not Our Central
Problem and Constitutional Revision Is Not the Solution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 767, 772 (2014) (referencing
"the expansion of the government agenda in the 1960s and 1970s").
130. Avishai Benish, Outsourcing, Discretion, and Administrative Justice: Exploring the
Acceptability of Privatized Decision Making 3 (Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance,
Working Paper No. 64, 2014).
131. See Overview of Awards-FY 2016, USA SPENDING, https://www.usaspending.gov/transpa
rency/Pages/OverviewOfAwards.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
132. See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: PrivatizingForeign Affairs and the Problem
of Accountability Under InternationalLaw, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 138 (2005) (discussing the
privatization of foreign affairs); Freeman, supra note 15, at 551-52 (discussing the pervasiveness of
private actors in "regulation, service provision, policy design, and implementation").
133. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and the
Incomplete Legal Framework for Public and Stakeholder Voice, 2009 J. DIsP. RESOL. 269, 272
(describing "the legal scholarship of the new governance").
134. See, e.g., Simon Chesterman, 'We Can't Spy.. . If We Can't Buy!': The Privatization of
Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing 'Inherently Governmental Functions,' 19 EUR. J. INT'L L.
1055, 1056-57 (2008) (noting that controversy over private military and security companies coalesces
around cost, self-dealing, corruption, accountability, and secrecy); Martha Minow, Outsourcing
Power: PrivatizingMilitary Efforts and the Risks to Accountability, Professionalism,and Democracy,
in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 97, at 110-27 (2009) (elaborating on same); VERKIJIL,
supranote 13, at I ("The government exercises sovereign powers. When those powers are delegated to
outsiders, the capacity to govern is undermined.").
135. Bingham, supra note 133, at273.
136. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down statute authorizing
local coal boards to determine coal prices and employee wages and hours). The Court based its
decision on the Commerce and Due Process Clauses. Id at 297-304.
137. See Metzger, supra note 20, at 1438-45.
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Court has never clarified the nature of government oversight required to
render a private delegation constitutional. If an agency transfers significant
governmental authority to a private party, no constitutional doctrine
addresses whether an official's "rubber stamp" suffices to render the
delegation constitutional.13 8 Additionally, private contractors are not
appointed by the President. The APA, the FOIA, and other processoriented statutes apply only to federal agencies.1 39 Private parties under
contract with the federal government are not subject to the same pay,
political activity, and labor restrictions that apply to government
employees. 40 As a consequence, although private parties exercising
government functions lie along a constitutional continuum with degrees of
separation from the President, there are few administrative or
establishing their accountability to the
constitutional law mechanisms
14
populace they serve. 1
2. Transparency
A second hallmark of good governance is transparency. To be sure, the
Constitution contains no public right of access to information regarding
the activities of government. 142 But transparency is reflected as a
normative value in the Constitution's express requirements that the
President report on the state of the Union 43 and that Congress keep 144a
same."'
"Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
Lawmaking takes place in public view; the legislature mediates numerous
138. See generally VERKUIL, supra note 13, at 109-10. The Department of Justice's Office of
Legal Counsel has construed Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140-41 (1976), to hold that "private
individuals may not determine the policy of the United States, or interpret and apply federal law in any
way that binds the United States or affects the legal rights of third parties" under the Constitution.
Constitutional Limits on "Contracting Out" Department of Justice Functions Under OMB Circular A76, 14 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 94, 99 (1990). "Properly appointed federal officials must maintain
both legal and effective control over the direction of United States policy ..... Id.
139. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2014).
140. Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time for Reflection and
Choice, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321,338 (2004).
141. See David H. Rosenbloom & Suzanne J. Piotrowski, Outsourcing the Constitution and
Administrative Law Norms, 35 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 103, 104-05 (2005).
142. Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial
Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 932 (2006); see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15
(1978) (plurality opinion) ("Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a
right of access to government information or sources of information within the government's
control."). Adam Samaha observes, however, that "[t]hree justices dissented [in Houchins], stressing
their opposition to total denial of public access to information about jail operations." Samaha, supra, at
942 n.151 (citing Houchins, 438 U.S. at 29-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
143. U.S. CONST. art. I1,§ 3.
144. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 3.
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competing interests and must reach a compromise in order to move
forward.
First Amendment jurisprudence supports the notion that without
transparency, responsive and adaptive government cannot exist. It is "well
established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information
and ideas."1 45 The Court has characterized the First Amendment as
"assur[ing] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people.' ' 146 The ability of the
people to speak and debate freely renders government responsive and
accountable to the people. 147 The Supreme Court has repeatedly construed
the Free Speech Clause as48enabling the citizenry to correct government
through wide-open debate.
Despite the normative value placed on transparency under the
Constitution, the public has limited access to information revealing the full
extent of private sector influence on government. Jody Freeman and
Martha Minow describe federal contracts made "literally off the books.' 49

145. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) ("[W]here a speaker exists, .... the
protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both. This is clear from
the decided cases."); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("[T]here is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs."); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) ("The public-official rule
protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public
officials, their servants. To this end, anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office is
relevant."); Samaha, supra note 142, at 941 (footnotes omitted) ("One can logically read the
Amendment as promoting a system of communication in which audiences possess interests in parity
with speakers. In fact, the Court had long accepted listeners' First Amendment interests. And the
judiciary was indicating that 'political speech' and 'robust' debate on 'public issues' were at the core
of its concerns.").
146. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (citing a 1774 letter by the Continental
Congress in I JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774)); accord Mills, 384 U.S. at

218-19.
147. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); Mills, 384 U.S. at 219; cf Gravel
v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 640-41 (1972).
148. See, e.g., Gravel, 408 U.S. at 640-41 (observing that the First Amendment protects not just
speakers but listeners-a protection that aids public access to information about government and thus
its ability to hold government accountable); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)
(observing that "free political discussion" serves "the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the
security of the Republic, [which] is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system"); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 37576 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)) (noting that the First Amendment protects "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open" dissemination of ideas because public debate ensures that government can be
changed).
149. Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction: Refraining the Outsourcing Debates, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supranote 97, at 1,3.
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Although Acquisition.gov 150 is the leading public website for government
contracting information, its information is coded for contractors, not lay
citizens, and5 does not include a central repository of federal contracting
documents. 1 1
Administrative law places no public disclosure requirements on private
contractors. 52 The APA's FOIA provisions do not cover records related to
the private sector's federal government work.1 53 Nor does the Federal
Advisory Committee Act ("FACA") 54 apply to require disclosure of
information regarding their role in government policymaking. In 2001,
then-Vice President Dick Cheney met with big oil companies to formulate
national energy policy that was "designed to help the private sector, and,
as necessary and appropriate, State and local governments," as well as to
"promote dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound production
and distribution of energy for the future." ' 55 As with the CPP, parts of that
effort under President George W. Bush "became law and parts ... are still
being debated."1 5 6 Critics claimed that the task force produced a package
industry ... at the expense of the
of "incentives for the energy
1 57
environment and public health."'
Environmental and citizen groups sued the Vice President under the
FACA, seeking disclosure of the participants' identities and meeting
minutes. The statute requires entities qualifying as "advisory committees"
to make public the "records, reports, transcripts, minutes, appendixes,
working papers, drafts, studies, agenda, or other documents which were
made available to or prepared for or by" the committees. 58 The Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the FACA did not apply to Cheney's
so-called "task force" members because "there is nothing to indicate that

150. ACQUISITION.GOV, https://www.acquisition.gov (last updated Mar. 16, 2016).
151. See id.
152. Rosenbloom & Piotrowski, supra note 141, at 104.
153. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended

at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2014)); see also VERKUIL, supra note 13, at 90 (noting that the FOIA is a "force for
public legitimacy" that does not apply to documents held by private contractors).
154. 5 U.S.C. App. § 2 (2014).
155. Eric Dannenmaier, Executive Exclusion and the Cloistering of the Cheney Energy Task
Force, 16 N.Y.U. ENVT'L L.J. 329, .330 (2008) (quoting NAT'L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GROUP,
NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY: RELIABLE, AFFORDABLE, AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR

AMERICA'S FUTURE viii (2001)).
156. Dana Milbank & Justin Blum, Document Says Oil Chiefs Met with Cheney Task Force,
WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/l1/15/
AR2005111501842.html.
157. Press Release, Nat'l Res. Defense Council, NRDC Offers Responsible Alternative to Bush
Energy Plan (May 17, 2001), available at http://www.nrdc.org/media/pressReleases/010517.asp.
158. 5 U.S.C. App. § 10(b) (2014).
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non-federal employees had a right to vote ... or exercise a veto."' 59 The
incident demonstrates that, for entities residing at the private end of the
constitutional policymaking continuum, achieving public transparency is a
tenuous proposition, regardless of the political proclivities of the person in
the White House-and even if identical tasks performed by federal
employees would be subject to public disclosure requirements.
3. Legitimacy
A third aspect of good government is legitimacy. Legitimacy refers to
the source or "justification of a government's authority to rule over its
people."' 6 "[G]overnment is said to be 'legitimate' if the people to whom
its orders are directed believe that the structure, procedures, acts,
decisions, policies, officials, or leaders of government possess the quality
of 'rightness,' propriety, or moral goodness-the right, in short, to make
binding rules.' 16 1 Legitimacy is related to how successful government is at
making a "normative case" for a particular policy or decision. 162 It is
"whatever is added to convert power into authority," but "also can refer to
63
perceptions: whether there is a belief that something is okay.'
The legitimacy of the United States government derives from its
constitutional authority and the democratic mandates of Congress and the
sitting President. 64 Congress has the power to make laws and is
accountable for the results at the voting booth. The Appointments Clause
renders the President and his appointees accountable for the execution of
the laws; Senate confirmation of the President's appointments triggers
public awareness. 65 Furthermore, the federal government's legitimacy
rests on the belief that public servants are susceptible to political-and

159. In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 730 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
160. Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New
Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71,126 (2000).
161. ROBERT A. DAHL, MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS 41 (2d ed. 1970); see also Daniel
Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International
Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 601 n.29 (1999).
162. Ku, supra note 160, at 126.
163. Schwarcz, supra note 107, at 323.
164. Michael Herz, Some Thoughts on Judicial Review and Collaborative Governance, 2009 J.

DisP. RESOL. 361, 365-66.
165.

U.S. CONST. art. 11,§ 2, cl.2; THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 517 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian

Shapiro ed., 2009).
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thus electoral-influence 6667 and that they are not financially motivated to
achieve certain outcomes.1
Neither the formal mandates of constitutional structure nor the
democratic process legitimates private parties' exercise of public
functions. The private sector is not technically bound by the Constitution
(with the exception of the Thirteenth Amendment) and its members are not
democratically elected. And unlike government actors, private sector
employees are not motivated to act for the primary benefit of the public6
1
good but are charged with maximizing profits for their employers.1
Inevitably, conflicts of interest impact private actors' ability to champion
the objectives of good government over the need to generate revenue for
their stakeholders. A private corporation hired to make individual public
benefits determinations for a fixed contract price, for example, will feel
pressure to truncate its adjudication methods to cut costs-even if that
means a less accurate or fair process for individual claimants.
Moreover, government contractors are not within the general purview
of the federal conflict of interest laws.' 69 Although the Federal Acquisition
Regulation 170 governs the process by which the government purchases
goods and services, its conflict of interest provisions do not take into
consideration whether a contractor's aims are "at odds with the 'public
71
'
interest,"' and its rules can be waived for contracts deemed essential.
Thus, even though many private contractors exercise powers identical to
those of public actors, existing constitutional and statutory law does
relatively little to foster legitimacy on the private end of the constitutional
policymaking spectrum.

166. Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV.
53, 54 (2008).
167. Federal criminal laws accordingly prohibit executive branch employees from participating
personally and substantially in matters that will affect their own financial interests. 18 U.S.C. § 208
(2014).

168. See Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Elusive Employee-Contractor Distinction, 46
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 185 (2012) ("Corporations' fiduciary duty to their shareholders requires them
to breach contracts when doing so would maximize profit.").
169. Jeffrey Lovitky, The Problems of Government Contracting for Consulting Services, 14 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 332, 345 (1983).
170. 48 C.F.R. ch. 1 (2016).
171. Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Century Culture of
Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 898 (2000)
(citing Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 48 C.F.R. pt. 2009.5 (1999)).

2016]

PUBLIC LAWS AND PRIVATE LAWMAKERS

4. RationalDecisionmaking
Lastly, good governance reflects rational decisionmaking, which is
inherent in the Constitution's structure. The first state constitutions
established strong legislatures that closely represented the people by
concentrating power in the lower assembly. 11 2 Constituents were
empowered to "'instruct' their representatives." 73 As a result, early state
legislatures were critiqued as captured by "selfish factions and demagogic
leaders" who "enacted ill-advised laws" at the expense of the public
74
good. 1
Mistrusting the people's proclivity towards popular rule by factions,
the Framers opted instead for a republic, which runs power through a
small number of wiser government representatives. 175 Because this
republic covers an extremely large population, opinions are diverse,
making it relatively difficult for a majority faction to take hold.176 The
Framers thus "relied on elected representatives to defuse, to compromise,
and, at best, to prevent the abuse of government
power from motives of
' 77
personal self-interest or majoritarian passion."'
This nod towards rational decisionmaking is reflected in the fact that
the APA contains detailed procedural requirements for legislative
rulemaking and formal adjudication and in the Supreme Court's
construction of the statute's standards for judicial review. 178 In Motor
Vehicles Manufacturers Association of the United States v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 79 the Court rejected the government's
argument for "rational basis" review under the APA, holding instead that
"the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory

172. Martin S. Flaherty, Relearning Founding Lessons: The Removal Power and Joint
Accountability, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1563, 1581-82 (1997) (quoting GORDON S. WOOD,
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 163 (1969)).
173. Id.at 1582.
174. Id. at 1583; see also Michael W. Dowdle, Public Accountability: Conceptual,Historical,and
Epistemic Mappings, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 3-4
(Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006) [hereinafter "PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY"] (noting early critiques of
"patronage-based politics").
175. The Founders offered vague definitions of the term "republic" at times. Alexander Hamilton
defined a republic as a government that "requires that the sense of the majority should prevail," THE
FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009), and James Madison defined

it as "a government in which the scheme of representation takes place," THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at51
(James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
176. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
177. See Hans A. Linde, Who is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO. L. REV.
709, 730 (1994).
178. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, 706 (2014).
179. 463 U.S. 29(1983).
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a rational connection between the facts
explanation for its action including
180
found and the choice made."'
Under outsourcing regimes, contract terms-and not statutory
procedures for rational decisionmaking-govern private actors'
performance. Judicial review for rationality and fairness is virtually nonexistent. Although private tort and contract law might apply to abuses by
government contractors, immunity defenses stymie lawsuits.' 8' Only the
government can sue private contractors under the Contract Disputes
Act. 182 In addition, agencies can contract out of statutory protections in the
negotiating process 183 and often lack the resources or motivation to pursue
common law remedies. 84 The False Claims Act' 85 enables qui tam suits to
for fraud but contains
recover penalties from private contractors
86
formidable barriers to judicial review.'
The lack of judicial oversight of privatized government is particularly
acute when federal agencies engage stealth factions of the private sector in
the policymaking process. In those circumstances, the meager statutory
frameworks for review of federal contracting decisions do not even apply.
Moreover, when the government formulates policy alongside a finite
segment of the community and to the exclusion of other interested groups,
it undermines the constitutional plan for representative democracyheightening the possibility that agencies will become "captured" by
180. Id. at 43 & n.9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. See, e.g., Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying immunity to private
foster care contractor in action under federal disability laws); Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield,
152 F.3d 67, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying immunity to private insurance company in Medicare
dispute); cf Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Outsourcing Is Not Our Only Problem, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1216, 1228 (2008) (arguing that private contractors should not be immunized for government work
performed).
182. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109 (2014).
183. But cf Wendy Netter Epstein, Contract Theories and the Failures of Public-Private
Contracting, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2211, 2254, 2256 (2013) (arguing a mandatory duty to act in
furtherance of the public interest should be implied in all government outsourcing contracts and that
"members of the public for whose benefit the service was being provided-and who are harmed when
service provision is poor-should be permitted to sue as third-party beneficiaries for breach of the
public interest duty"); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2003) (arguing that contracts should reflect public law values through a process
of"publicization").
184. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Accountability Through Privatization, in PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 174, at 83, 97-98 (explaining how both the executive and legislative
branches may lack the motivation to hold private actors accountable).
185. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2014).
186. See Laura A. Dickinson, Public Values/Private Contract, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT,
supra note 97, at 356.
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factions and abdicate their primary obligation to serve the public good. 187
A doctrinal shift is needed to account for the tension that privatized
government creates within the constitutional policymaking continuum.
II. DOCTRINAL RESPONSES TO STRUCTURAL DISRUPTIONS TO THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS

This Part discusses the foundational constitutional doctrine bearing on
structural disruptions in the separation of powers and highlights an
anomaly created by agency subdelegations of legislative power to the
private sector. When Congress delegates its legislative powers, the
nondelegation doctrine applies to monitor adherence to principles of
constitutional structure. Yet if agencies-as recipients of such powerssubdelegate them to private actors, none of the separation of powers
principles that governed Congress's initial delegation apply. The other
doctrinal mechanism for judicial review of "first-order" delegations of
legislative authority-Chevron and its progeny-similarly fails to account
for "second-order" delegations of policymaking authority by agencies to
the private sector.
A. The Delegation Doctrines
The nondelegation and private delegation doctrines spring from the
structural principles underlying the Constitution's design. The Supreme
Court stated in J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States that the
Constitution "divide[s] the governmental power into three branches" and
imposes a rule that "in the actual administration of the government
Congress ...

should exercise the legislative power, the President ...

executive power, and the Courts or the judiciary the judicial power."'

the
88 By

187. See Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, Introduction, in PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 13 (2014) (Daniel Carpenter & David
A. Moss eds., 2013) ("Regulatory Capture is the result or process by which regulation, in law or
application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward the
interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry itself."); Mark C. Niles, On
the Hijacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The Federal Aviation Administration. "Agency Capture, "
and Airline Security, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 381, 388 (2002) (describing agency
capture as "an attempt to promote the 'private' interest of the regulated group at the expense of some
broader interest of the public as a whole, which would otherwise have been the primary concern of the
regulatory agency"); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1039, 1052 (1997) ("[C]apture theory ... suggests that aggressive judicial oversight and
control of agencies is needed in order to counteract the distortions of the administrative process
introduced by interest group capture and other pathologies.").
188. 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
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constitutional design, therefore, no single branch can exercise too much
power over the governed, and each branch operates as a check on the
power of the other branches.' 89 The Supreme Court has accordingly
scrutinized legislation creating novel government structures' 9" to ensure
that no one branch aggrandizes its power at another's expense'91 and that
executive branch agencies remain susceptible to some measure of
presidential control.' 92
The nondelegation doctrine similarly functions to confine
constitutionally vested legislative power in Congress.' 93 It derives from
John Locke's social contract theory, which binds citizens to "the laws
enacted by democratic legislatures exercising the power delegated to it by
the people. 1 94 The Constitution has no inherent powers; "the only
legitimate fountain of power" derives from the people. 95 Thus, only the
people's elected representatives may exercise its powers. 196 In theory, the
nondelegation doctrine "ensures to the extent consistent with orderly
governmental administration that important choices of social policy are
the branch of our government most responsive to the
made by Congress,
97
popular will.'
189. Metro. Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501
U.S. 252, 272 (1991) ("The ultimate purpose of[the] separation of powers is to protect the liberty and
security of the governed.").
190. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1,6 (1994).
191. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-24 (1976).
192. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 506-07 (2010).
193. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989) ("The nondelegation doctrine is
rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government....
Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch."); see also Field v. Clark,
143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ("That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a
principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
ordained by the Constitution.").
194. Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the Administrative State: The Interrelationship Between
the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921, 927 (2006) (citing JOHN LOcKE,
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 52-65 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing Co., Inc. 1980)
(1690)).
195. Flaherty, supra note 172, at 1586 (quoting WOOD, supra note 172, at 550). "[Bly placing
sovereignty in the people, both liberal theory and the Constitution make the political sovereign the
source of delegated, not inherent, powers." Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of
Government Functions,84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 407 (2006).
196. See LOCKE, supra note 194, at 74-75. But see Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash,
Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2007) (observing that adherents of the
"prodelegation school" think that Congress can delegate legislative power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause and that, "[wlhile Article I, Section 7 outlines one method of making law, it never
decrees that it is the only means of making law").
197. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607, 685
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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The nondelegation doctrine formally emerged in the nineteenth
century, 9 8 reaching its prominence in post-New Deal litigation around the
propriety of the burgeoning administrative state. 199 In Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan,2 °° the Court struck down a provision of the National
Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA")20 1 that empowered the President to
manage a statutory prohibition on interstate shipment of petroleum
because that Congress had set "no criterion to govern the President's
course. ' 2°2 In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 203 it found
unconstitutional another NIRA provision authorizing private trade and
industrial groups, subject to the President's approval, to draft codes of fair
competition governing the sale of chickens. 0 4 Congress, the Court
explained, is "not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential
legislative functions with which it is thus vested. 20 5
Since the NIRA cases, the nondelegation doctrine has failed to fulfill
its constitutional potential as a means of confining legislative power to the
Congress, despite its prominence as what Gary Lawson calls "the
foundation of American representative government." 20 6 Less than a decade
later, the Court in Yakus v. United States "completely shifted to valuing
congressional flexibility and freedom over a strict application of the
nondelegation doctrine."20 7 At issue was a statute delegating to an
198. Initially, the Supreme Court upheld delegations of lawmaking authority in the face of such
challenges. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 6, 43 (1825) (upholding constitutionality
of Congress's delegation to the judiciary the authority to establish procedures for service of process
and execution of judgments because such power was conferred pursuant to "general provisions to fill
up the details"); Field, 143 U.S. at 693 (holding that delegation of authority to the President to suspend
tariffs for imports was constitutional as the President was acting as "the mere agent of the law-making
department to ascertain and declare the event upon which [Congress's] expressed will was to take
effect"); see also United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 518 (1911) (upholding constitutionality of
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture regarding the use of federal grazing lands,
subject to criminal penalties, as the agency "confin[ed] [itself] within the field covered by the statute
•.. in order to administer the law and carry the statute into effect").
199. See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Metzger, supra note 20, at 1438-42 (discussing
nondelegation cases in the Supreme Court following the New Deal).
200. 293 U.S. 388.
201. 15 U.S.C. § 703.
202. Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 415.
203. 295 U.S. 495.
204. Id. at521-53,521 n.4.
205. ld at 529. Within its separation of powers doctrine, the Supreme Court has been more
hawkish about striking down attempts by one branch to aggrandize its power at the expense of another.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-24 (1976).
206. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 332 (2002); see also
Freeman, supra note 184, at 88 (arguing that despite the nondelegation doctrine, Congress has the
power to delegate "broad powers that afford private actors considerable discretion").
207. Garry, supra note 194, at 932-33.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 93:615

administrative agency the power to fix commodities prices in response to
wartime inflation. Emphasizing the need for legislative "flexibility," the
Court drew the constitutional line at "an absence of standards for the
guidance of the Administrator's action, so that it would be impossible in a
proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been
obeyed., 20 8 Because standards existed in the statute, no unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power occurred.
The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed Congress's broad authority to
delegate so long as its enabling legislation includes an "intelligible
principle" to guide the exercise of discretion, 9 sustaining delegations
with legislative directives that are as vague as acting "in the public
interest.'2 '0 The Court has justified its stance by parsing some delegations
as more "executive" in nature than others. "[Plowers which are strictly and
exclusively legislative" cannot be delegated, whereas "those of less
interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to
those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details"
can be. 21t Because the line between the two "has not been exactly
208. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,426 (1944).
209. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1996); Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 379 (1989). The Court applied the intelligible principle test to uphold several legislative
delegations before Schechter Poultry Corp. and Panama Refining Co. See Fed. Radio Comm'n v.
Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 284 (1933) (sustaining agency's power to set rules
regarding issuance of radio station licenses); N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 2527 (1932) (upholding the Interstate Commerce Commission's statutory authority to regulate mergers
and acquisitions of railroads).
210. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (citing Nat'l Broad. Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943); N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp., 287 U.S. at 24-25) ("[W]e have
found an 'intelligible principle' in various statutes authorizing regulation in the 'public interest."'); see
also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413, 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What legislated standard, one must
wonder, can possibly be too vague to survive judicial scrutiny, when we have repeatedly upheld, in
various contexts, a 'public interest' standard?"). Justice Scalia nonetheless suggested in Mistretta v.
United States that "the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation" of legislative and policymaking power
is so "essential to democratic government" that "[o]ur members of Congress could not, even if they
wished, vote all power to the President and adjourn sine die." Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415. Nor, he
added, could some lawmakers hand off their constitutional duties, such as voting on bills. See id. at
417. "By a parity of reasoning," Professor Verkuil has argued, "the President cannot turn the executive
power over to the Vice President and retire in office." Verkuil, supra note 195, at 425. He thus
contends that the powers exercised by principal officers who were confirmed by the Senate and have
taken oaths to uphold the Constitution are similarly nondelegable. Id. The President can delegate to
subordinates under the Subdelegation Act, with limits (i.e., he can only delegate to officers of the
United States). Id. at 426 (citing 3 U.S.C. §§ 301-302 (2014)). By the same token, the statute limits the
President's ability to delegate to lesser officials or outside parties. See id. The Act notwithstanding,
Professor Verkuil argues that "[t]he President could never claim an inherent power to delegate official
duties to private hands." Id. at 427-28.
211. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825); see also generally Alexander &
Prakash, supra note 196, at 1041-42 (describing four different views of what Congress does when it
delegates power, including the "Formalist Account [which] regards conventional delegations as
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drawn, ' ,21 2 the regulatory state operates under a substantial amount of

legislative ambiguity, 21 3 prompting Justice Thomas to query whether

"delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders'
understanding of separation of powers."21 4
The intelligible principle test may be understood as a pragmatic
reflection of the Court's belief that necessity "fixes a point beyond which
it is unreasonable and impractical to compel Congress to prescribe detailed
rules. 21 5 In Mistretta v. United States, the Court blunted its rhetoric to
suggest that "'Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to
another Branch. 2 16 By the Court's account, this "general" separation of
powers interdiction must give way to "a practical understanding that in our
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more
technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to
delegate power under broad general directives. 21 7 Thus, Congress is
constitutionally free to "obtain[] the assistance of its coordinate Branches"
in fulfilling its constitutional mandate, 21 8 particularly "where flexibility
and the adaptation of the congressional policy to infinitely variable
conditions constitute the essence of the program" in question.21 9
The question of whether Congress can delegate legislative power
directly to the private sector-bypassing the executive branch altogetherdelegations of rulemaking authority, without any actual delegation of legislative power," and their
adherents).
212. Wayman, 23 U.S. at 43; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 487 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) ("Interpreting a
law enacted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the
law."); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911) ("[W]hen Congress had legislated and
indicated its will, it could give to those who were to act under such general provisions 'power to fill up
the details' by the establishment of administrative rules and regulations .... "); Field v. Clark, 143
U.S. 649, 693 (1892) (upholding delegation where the President was acting only as "the mere agent of
the law-making department to ascertain and declare the event upon which [Congress's] expressed will
was to take effect"); see also generally Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928)
(noting that the authority to enforce the laws and to appoint agents to do so are executive functions);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (same).
213. Garry, supra note 194, at 940.
214. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring); Mark
Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise ofthe "New" Nondelegation Doctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2000) ("Once the reality that officials must be allowed to exercise such discretion is
recognized, there is no principled way for the judiciary to draw a line between allowed and prohibited
delegations of rulemaking authority.").
215. Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559-60 (1976) (quoting Am.
Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)).
216. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989) (emphasis added) (citing Field, 143
U.S. at 692).
217. ld. at 372.
218. Id.
219. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785 (1948).
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was addressed most prominently in Carterv. Carter Coal Co.220 in Carter,
the Court struck down the Bituminous Conservation Coal Act, which
authorized coal miners and producers to establish wages and maximum
labor hours for mine workers. 22 1 The statute required no governmental
imprimatur before the provisions took effect. "This is legislative
delegation in its most obnoxious form," the Court wrote, "for it is not even
delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested,
but to private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the
interests of others in the same business., 222 Grasping for a public-private
dividing line, the Court reasoned that "[t]he difference between producing
coal and regulating its production is, of course, fundamental. The former is
,,223
a private activity; the latter is necessarily a governmental function ....
To be sure, delegations to the executive branch are not delegations to
the President per se, but to an administrative bureaucracy. The
administrative bureaucracy is larger, more nuanced, and more complex
than Congress. Agency officials are not directly accountable at the voting
booth and only tangentially through the President. As Alexander Hamilton
. . tends to
wrote in Federalist No. 70, "a plurality 2 in
24 the executive .
conceal faults, and destroy responsibility.
Private parties, by contrast, are not politically accountable, even
2 25
through the President. Their terms and duties are of limited duration.
Unlike a federal officer, for whom "a superior can fix and then change the
specific set of duties," private actors "hav[e] those duties fixed by a
contract. 226 And although private actors are made accountable to some
degree by reputation, their respective constituencies are narrow and not
disinterested.22 7
Legal commentators have accordingly called private delegations more
troubling "than the broadest delegations to public agencies., 228 Since the

220.
221.

298 U.S. 238 (1936).
ld at 310-11.

222. ld at 311. The Court further suggested that the delegation violated due process to the extent
that it allowed private parties to regulate competitors. Id. This argument is problematic to the extent
that it applies procedural due process protections to a legislative versus adjudicative decision. See BiMetallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915) (holding that "a general
determination" affecting a large number of people in unexceptional ways is not bound by due process).
223. Carter,298 U.S. at 311.
224. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 358 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
225. United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1867).
226. Constitutional Separation of Powers, supranote 111, at 141 (citing Hartwell, 73 U.S. at 393).
227. Schwarcz, supra note 107, at 335 n.97.
228. Freeman, supra note 15, at 583-84 (citing Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary
Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government,

85 Nw. U. L. REV. 62, 69 n.17 (1990); David M. Lawrence, The Private Exercise of Governmental
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New Deal cases, however, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld
delegations to agencies and private parties alike.2 29 In Currinv. Wallace, it
found constitutional a statutory scheme that afforded private industry an
"effective veto" over government regulations affecting tobacco markets.230
And in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 231 it upheld a statute
allowing private coal producers to propose minimum coal prices to a
government commission on the grounds that the industry merely
"function[ed] subordinately to the Commission," which retained the
ultimate authority to implement legislative standards.2 32
The Court had a recent opportunity to revisit the private delegation
doctrine in Department of Transportation v. Ass'n of American
23 3 On appeal
Railroads.
was a decision of the D.C. Circuit finding
unconstitutional a portion of the Passenger Rail Investment and
Improvement Act of 2008 ("PRIIA") 234 that authorizes Amtrak-a
congressionally-created government corporation-to jointly develop
passenger rail performance measures with the Federal Railroad
Administration. The statute provides further that if such measures are not
timely promulgated, "any party involved in the development of those
standards may petition the Surface Transportation Board to appoint an
arbitrator to assist the parties in resolving their disputes through binding
arbitration. 235 Deeming Amtrak "private" for delegation purposes, the
D.C. Circuit applied the maxim that "[f]ederal lawmakers cannot delegate
regulatory authority to a private entity" and struck down the PRIIA as
unconstitutional.236 It reasoned that, unlike Amtrak, the private parties in
Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 649-50 (1986)); cf Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation
Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY

931, 979 (2014) (questioning whether a private delegation doctrine exists separate from the
nondelegation doctrine).
229. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-74 (2001) (holding that the
phrase, "requisite to protect the public health," was sufficiently determinate to guide the
Environmental Protection Agency's establishment of national ambient air quality standards under the
Clean Air Act); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310
U.S. 381 (1940).

230. 306 U.S. I (upholding statute that required two-thirds of regulated industry to approve
regulations before they could take effect).
231. 310U.S. 381.
232. Id. at 399.
233. 135 S.Ct. 1225 (2015).
234. Pub. L. No. 110-432, 122 Stat. 4848, 4907 (2008).
235. Id.at 4917.
236. Ass'n ofAmer. R.R.s v. Dep't of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated, 135
S. Ct. 1225.
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Currin and Adkins did not "stand on equal footing with a government
agency" under the respective statutes in question in those cases.23 7
The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that Amtrak is a
governmental entity and remanded the case for consideration, inter alia, of
whether the statute violates the private delegation doctrine. 38 Writing for
the Court, Justice Kennedy emphasized the transparency and
accountability mechanisms that necessarily bind Amtrak as a government
actor, and linked those features to "'[t]he structural principles secured by
the separation of powers,"' which "'protect the individual.' ' 2 39 In separate
concurring opinions, both Justice Alito and Justice Thomas opined that the
PRIIA violates the private delegation doctrine. For Justice Alito, the
problem was the lack of political accountability for regulatory activity
under the statutory scheme, as "[1]iberty requires accountability., 240 "If the
arbitrator can be a private person," he wrote, "this law is
unconstitutional. 24 ' Justice Thomas ventured further, questioning the
constitutionality of the entire federal regulatory apparatus on the theory
that "the Constitution categorically242forbids Congress to delegate its
legislative power to any other body.,
Although the private delegation doctrine technically concerns itself
with the scope of Congress's authority to outsource legislative power,
executive branch handoffs of its delegated authority to private parties are
just as constitutionally intolerable under Justices Alito and Thomas's
reading of Article I. In Justice Alito's words, "[w]hen it comes to private
entities ... there is not even a fig leaf of constitutional justification" for
declining to enforce a black letter nondelegation doctrine. 243 Taken
together, the concurring opinions in Association of American Railroads
suggest that if the case returns to the Supreme Court for resolution of the
private delegation question, there will be support for its revival in ways
that could apply to cabin privatization through the courts.
For now, when private parties draft legislation, the primary rationale
behind nondelegation-ensuring that "the will of Congress has been
at 671 n.5.
237. Id.
238. Ass'nofAmer. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. at 1233-34.
239. Id. at 1233 (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011)).
concurring).
at 1234 (Alito, J.,
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1237.
at 1246 (Thomas, J., concurring).
242. Id.
243. Id.at 1237 (Alito, J., concurring). "Because a private entity is neither Congress, nor the
President or one of his agents, nor the Supreme Court or an inferior court established by Congress,"
Justice Thomas added, "the Vesting Clauses would categorically preclude it from exercising the
legislative, executive, or judicial powers of the Federal Government." Id. at 1252 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).

2016]

PUBLIC LAWS AND PRIVATE LAWMAKERS

obeyed"-must be enforced elsewhere in constitutional doctrine. 244 As
explained below, the other doctrinal lens for confining agencies' exercise
of legislative power-Chevron and its progeny-is similarly indifferent to
private sector policymaking on the people's behalf. This constitutional
infirmity renders painstakingly constructed separation of powers doctrine
inapposite in the modem administrative state.
B. Chevron andIts Progeny
Even if Congress's delegations are constitutional under prevailing law,
the nondelegation and private delegation doctrines have nothing to say
about subdelegations of policymaking authority by federal agencies to the
private sector. Private sector lawmaking is excluded from constitutional
scrutiny even though the power exercised derives from the same political
sovereign-the people. The separation of powers implications of such
delegations-within-delegations must be captured, if at all, by Chevron. Yet
like nondelegation, Chevron doctrine fails to account for policymaking by
the private sector at the behest of agencies to which Congress delegated
rulemaking authority in the first instance.
Before Chevron, courts operated under a "general principle of
deference." 245 When agencies acted under broad grants of legislative
authority to prescribe rules and regulations, courts were disinclined to
defer to agency constructions of statutes.246 Deference was appropriate
only when Congress specifically delegated power "to define a statutory
term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory provision" 247 and
agencies "implement[ed] the congressional mandate in some reasonable
manner." 248 Even then, this deference principle merely "set the framework
for judicial analysis; it d[id] not displace it."'249 Courts "were allowed to
substitute judgment on250agency interpretations that could be characterized
as 'questions of law."'

244. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944).
245. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew
D. Krueger, In Search of the Modem Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1257 (2007)
(discussing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), and noting that, "[p]rior to Chevron, the
courts relied upon a host of factors to determine the appropriate level of deference owed to an agency's
interpretation in any given case").
246. See, e.g., Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. at 24.
247. See Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981); see also Garry, supra note 194,
at 942.
248. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967).
249. United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973).
250. William R. Andersen, Against Chevron-A Modest Proposal, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 957, 958
(2004).
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Chevron altered this judicial prerogative by requiring that courts defer
to agencies' interpretations of ambiguous statutes the agencies are charged
with administering. 251 At issue in Chevron was the propriety of an EPA
rule that defined the statutory term "stationary source" to mean the entirety
of a power plant rather than individual structures within a plant that emit
pollution. 252 The Court set forth a two-step inquiry for judicial review of
an agency's interpretation of a statute that it is charged with administering:
first, "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
253
issue"; if so, the agency must apply the clear mandate of Congress.
Second, if a statute is ambiguous, the question becomes whether the
interpretation of the statute adopted by the agency is "reasonable." If so,
the court must defer to that interpretation.25 4 This rule applies "even to
pure questions of law, about which courts might appear to have a strong
claim of superior expertise., 255 Chevron thus "move[d] an essential
legislative function-the ability to make policy through the power to
interpret statutes-squarely into the President's domain. ' 256 An agency
can pick amongst a range of competing meanings of statutory text and
corresponding policy options, knowing that courts must uphold its choice.
As a result, agencies can "reshape the political decisions made in the
legislative process. 2 57
Chevron's mandate of judicial deference to an agency's interpretation
of ambiguous statutory language follows from the Court's doctrinal
compromise on nondelegation.25 8 Agencies can legislate so long as there is
an intelligible principle to guide their discretion. Chevron established a
method for identifying the extent of that discretion under a given statute.
In examining when to extend deference to decisions less formal than
notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Court in United States v. Mead
Corp.259 and Barnhart v. Walton260 expanded agencies' policymaking
authority even further.
Like nondelegation, Chevron is a prudential doctrine that responds to
the practical limitations on Congress's ability to monopolize
251. See Garry, supra note 194, at 922.
252. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
253. Id. at 842.
254. Id. at 845.
255. Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 744 (2004).
256. Garry, supra note 194, at 947 (internal quotation marks omitted).
257. Id.
258. Id.at 923 ("The evolution of the nondelegation doctrine essentially necessitates the Chevron
doctrine.").
259. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
260. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
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policymaking. Its modest goal is to ensure fidelity to the text and spirit of
an enabling statute, however vague, and "to ensure that the administrative
agency stays within the zone of discretion committed to it by its organic
act.",261 In Chevron, the Court premised its deference requirement on three
rationales: (1) agencies have specialized expertise that exceeds that of
courts and even Congress; (2) agencies are more politically accountable
than courts; and (3) agencies received the power to fill in the gaps of
ambiguous statutes directly from Congress. 262 None of these rationales
support deference to an agency's adoption of the private sector's
construction of legislation that the agency is charged with administering.
The first rationale for Chevron deference embraces the view that
agencies have more particularized expertise in the subject matter of
statutes they are charged with administering than courts do. In Chevron,
the Court observed that Congress might have "consciously desired the
Administrator to strike the balance" by regulation, "thinking that those
with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the
provision" at issue would be better able to reconcile competing policies
than Congress itself.263 In his contemporaneous explanation of the New
Deal, James Landis characterized agencies as responsive to society's need
for government regulation to an extent that exceeds the capabilities of
Congress; unlike Congress or the courts, agencies are experts in their
respective fields of lawmaking. 264 Professor Funk has construed this
analysis as implying that "agencies faced problems capable of objective
solution, that politically neutral administrators could determine finite and
correct answers to the problems of modern industrial society."26' 5
To be sure, individuals in the private sector may have equivalent or
even superior expertise in certain subjects as compared to government
employees. 266 But their incentive to make policy decisions in a manner
that maximizes their own profit-even if such actions conflict with the
legislative mandates of Congress-undermines the expertise rationale for

261. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33 (1983).
262. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 865-66
(1984).
263. Id. at 865.
264. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1-16,23-24,45-56 (1938).

265. Funk, supra note 125, at 90.
266. Regulators' adoption of privately drafted standards is not uncommon in certain industries.
See Shapiro, supra note 103, at 401-02 (discussing, for example, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration's adoption of protective health standards written by the American Conference of
Governmental and Industrial Hygienists and the Security and Exchange Commission's requirement
that financial statements be prepared in accordance with accounting principles that were historically
provided by private accounting associations).
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deference to policy decisions made by private contractors.167 When private
regulatory committees are dominated by industry, their work "results in
lowest-common-denominator regulatory standards. ''268 Scholars have
observed, for example, that "the private sector often fails to accommodate
health or safety considerations satisfactorily" when it is delegated
responsibility for setting standards.2 69 Once private parties exercise
regulatory power in self-interested ways, agencies may lack the political
capital or superior expertise to second-guess them. 270 Moreover, a private
industry's steady push for reductions in the scope of regulation belies a
bias that is inconsistent with objective expertise. 27 Thus, the Chevron
Court's expertise rationale for deference does not readily translate into
deference for policymaking by private parties.
The second rationale for Chevron deference-that agencies are
politically accountable-is even less transferrable to the private sector.
The Chevron Court reasoned that agency officials, through their link to the
President, have greater accountability to the general public than does the
judiciary.272 Thus, "an agency to which Congress has delegated
policymaking responsibilities may... properly rely upon the incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments." 273 Judges
cannot. "While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of
the Government to make such policy choices. 274
at 404-05, 407, 426 ("[S]elf-regulation is more likely to reflect the political power of the
267. Id.
self-regulated industry than the product of rational decisionmaking by an agency."). Negotiated
rulemaking lessens this problem because it includes a variety of parties with affected interests. See id.
at 411-12.
at 427.
268. Id.
269. Id.at 407-08 (quoting Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the
Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329,
1380-83 (1978), and citing THOMAS 0. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE
FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 283 (1993)).
270. ld.at405,411.
271. See David A. Moss & Daniel Carpenter, Conclusion:A Focus on Evidence and Prevention,
in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra note 187, at 456 ("Today,... firms regularly aim to
weaken regulation to reduce the costs of compliance ...").
272. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)
("[F]ederal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made
by those who do.").

273. ld. at 865.
274. Id. Although it is technically true that agency officials are more accountable to the populace
than federal judges because the unelected judiciary is appointed for life, the line of accountability from
career agency employees to the President is quite attenuated. Moreover, numerous scholars have
questioned whether agency employees are in fact more susceptible to industry capture than top-down
political influence. Capture occurs when regulatory agencies are so heavily influenced by the very
industries they are charged with regulating that they regulate in ways that benefit those industries
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Private parties, by contrast, are not beholden to the democratic process.
Private contractors are unelected and unappointed, residing outside the
bureaucratic umbrella of Article II. They are not bound by the same legal
and constitutional constraints that apply to government employees. The
public has no legal mechanism for rendering private contractors' actions
transparent or subjecting their decisions to judicial review. Private
contractors are held accountable-if at all-via judicial enforcement of
contract terms in actions brought exclusively by the government. The
Chevron Court's second rationale for agency deference thus does not
support deference to the private sector's resolution of policy ambiguities
in federal legislation.
The third rationale for Chevron deference turns on presumed
congressional intent, which is the Court's theory of choice for justifying
deference to agencies post-Chevron.275 According to the Chevron Court,
"[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation., 276 If there is no such explicit
conferral of authority to make rules with legislative force, the Court
explained in United States v. Mead, courts should infer from an "agency's
generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that
Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of
law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the
enacted law." 277 In National Cable & TelecommunicationsAss 'n v. Brand
X Internet Services, the Court put it in delegation terms: "ambiguities in
statutes within an agency's jurisdiction to administer are delegations of
278
authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in a reasonable fashion.,
Thus, Chevron allows Congress to pass a legislative matter onto an agency
without clear definition of the limits of the agency's discretion on the
theory that Congress wants it that way.

rather than in the public interest. See Moss & Carpenter, supra note 271, at 455-56 (suggesting that
industry pressure to reduce regulation, or corrosive capture, is more common than industry efforts to
regulate); see also Nancy Watzman, Rulemaking in the Dark: Little Disclosure When Big Food
Lobbies the FDA, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Sept. 26, 2013, 7:14 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/
2013/09/26/Rulemaking in the darkFDA/ (stating that, in thirty-three meetings over a two-year
period, industry group representatives were present at FDA meetings four times as often as consumer
groups, culminating in food safety rules that the American Bakers Association called "a major victory"
for its members).
275. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 863 (2001).
276. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
277. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
278. 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66).

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 93:615

Scholars have critiqued Chevron as a violation of the separation of
powers, both because it unduly circumscribes courts' role to "say what the
law is"279 and because it empowers agencies to make law--otherwise a job
for Congress.28 ° Chevron's deference to agency constructions of vague
language is also at odds with the nondelegation doctrine's requirement of
an intelligible principle, which ostensibly tolerates the transfer of power
only "so long as it will be adequately controlled. 2 81 With Chevron,
ambiguity in legislation enhances agency power to make policy. An
intelligible principle must be sufficiently ambiguous to trigger Chevron
deference-at least to the extent that such deference is justified by
presumed congressional intent.28 2 This intersection between Chevron and
the intelligible principle standard underscores that policymaking by any
entity other than Congress has profound constitutional implications.
Chevron's reliance on legislative intent to justify deference to
agencies' policy judgments does not support deference to private parties'
performance of congressionally-delegated policymaking functions.
Agencies-like Congress-are representatives of the public interest, a role
that "does not permit [them] to act as an umpire blandly calling balls and
strikes for adversaries appearing before [them]. ' '283 The public is entitled
to "receive active and affirmative protection at the hands of the [agency]"
as a byproduct of its delegated constitutional power.2 84 Private parties are
not similarly constrained by public interest norms when they design public
policy in the first instance. Their incentives are necessarily self-serving
and possibly in conflict with the best interests of the broader populace. In
outsourcing regulatory power to private entities, therefore, agencies
compromise their ability to fulfill their role as representatives of the public
interest.
To be sure, an agency is positioned to adjust a regulation that is
privately drafted to take into account the public interest before a rule
279. Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in the PostChevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 787 (1991) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137,
177 (1803)).
280. See Linda Jellum, Chevron's Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59
ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 742 (2007).

281. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 487 (1989); see also Garry, supra note 194, at 951.
282. See Garry,supra note 194, at 952.
283. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965).
But see Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaborationas the Basisfor Flexible
Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 414 (2000) ("The purpose of the regulatory process is not
to implement a government-defined conception of the public good, but rather to supply benefits
demanded by groups on behalf of their members' private interests.").
284. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference, 354 F.2d at 620.
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becomes final. Because legislative rules are subject to the APA's notice
and comment or formal rulemaking procedures before they can have the
force of law, the rulemaking process necessarily operates to counteract
private sector bias with the imprimatur of good government. Michael Herz
has suggested, however, that "[t]his argument is quite flawed, a classic,
mistaken greater-includes-the-lesser argument." 285 Such "claims of
rational justifications for rules are often smokescreens for interest group
horse-trading, with the agency playing mediator, orchestrator, or
auctioneer., 286 Paul Verkuil points out, moreover, that overworked agency
officials increasingly delegate the task of summarizing comments to
private parties and simply "sign[] off on the results., 287 This temptation to
rubber stamp the work of private contractors means that countervailing
public interest norms may not meaningfully influence the rulemaking
process when private parties do the initial drafting. Thus, "[t]he
responsibility for knowing the record before decisions are made cannot be
delegated if the agency wants to retain true decision power and discharge
its public responsibilities. 2 88
Moreover, agencies are prone to adhere to the policy judgments made
in draft rules that are put open for public comment. This so-called
"anchoring effect" on agencies means that "[d]efects in the antecedent
process cannot be so easily dismissed.2 89 When private parties are
responsible for policy judgments in the first instance, agencies are apt to
make "after-the-fact rationale[s] attempting to justify decisions made" 29at0
the early stages of a rulemaking-"for reasons we can never know.,
Empirical studies support this conclusion. Unless there is public consensus
that a proposed rule should be changed, agencies tend to side with the
comments that support the initial draft. 291 As a consequence, interested
parties must "get[] heard prior to an agency setting its proposal in stone, as
is likely the case with the publication of a formal notice of proposed rule

285. Herz, supra note 164, at 376 (discussing phenomenon in the context of negotiated
rulemaking).
286. Peter H. Schuck & Steven Kochevar, Reg Neg Redux: The Career of a Procedural Reform,
15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 417, 431 (2014).

287. Verkuil, supra note 31, at 928.
288. Id.
289. Herz, supra note 164, at 376; see also James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral
Economics and Its Meaning for Antitrust Agency Decision Making, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 779, 788

(2012) (discussing anchoring or "confirmation bias" in the context of antitrust policymaking).
290. Funk, supra note 125, at 79 (discussing phenomenon in the context of negotiated
rulemaking).
291. Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 22, at 353, 356 (citing Marissa Golden, Interest Groups in the
Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &

THEORY 245 (1998)).
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making. '292 And "[o]nce this occurs,... inertia makes it more difficult for
an interest group to influence the agency to make major changes. 93
Thus, like the nondelegation doctrine, Chevron deference does not
account for private sector influence on policymaking, which as a
consequence operates beyond the scope of judicial review. 294 The next Part
offers an alternative approach to Chevron and nondelegation that
recognizes the constitutional significance of the private sector's furtive
influence on the rulemaking process. In short, when rules are organized
and drafted in the first instance by entities other than the agency delegatee
identified in the enabling legislation, judicial review must be more-not
less-searching.
III. THE CASE

FOR ENHANCED JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY

SUBDELEGATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

This Part urges a more rigorous application of the private delegation
doctrine and Chevron to rulemakings that are conducted by private parties
without the express consent of Congress. To the extent that agency
subdelegations of policymaking power are not grounded in statutory text,
they would seem perforce to violate both the nondelegation and Chevron
doctrines. Thus, in "its role as protector of the constitutional design, 2 9 5
the Supreme Court should develop a private subdelegation doctrine that
requires congressional authorization for agency handoffs of legislative
authority to the private sector.
Additionally, or in the alternative, the Court should decline to apply
Chevron deference to rulemakings that are heavily influenced by
unrepresentative segments of the private sector. Courts are better suited
than extraconstitutional, private actors to render definitive interpretations
of vague legislation. Such adaptations of the nondelegation and Chevron
292. Id. at 363; see also David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine,
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 259 (2001) (noting that high level ratification of proposed rules is often
automatic, for many reasons, making it difficult to reverse course). But see Schuck & Kochevar, supra
note 286, at 430 ("If a negotiated rule really did flout the public interest or meaningfully depart from
norms of reasoned decision-making, we should expect notice and comment procedures and judicial
review to detect and reject it.").
293. Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 22, at 363.
294. Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and
Remediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221, 225 (2012) (stating that "[w]hen we see an agency
... adopting regulatory policies favored by regulated entities," the situation "open[s] the door for the
agency or regulated entities to defend the agency's policy choices as the best the agency could do
under its mandate to protect the public").
295. Barbara Hinkson Craig & Robert S. Gilmour, The Constitution and Accountabilityfor Public
Functions, 5 GOVERNANCE 46, 50 (1992).
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doctrines would foster normative principles of good governmentincluding public accountability, transparency, legitimacy, and rational
decisionmaking-when public power is exercised on the private end of the
constitutional policymaking continuum.
A. A Private Subdelegation Doctrine
The nondelegation and private delegation doctrines grapple with a
tension between workability and accountability; that is, how to develop
legal doctrine that reflects the layered nature of modem government while
ensuring fidelity to the separation of powers. This tension defines the
battleground for constitutional analysis of unorthodox quasi-governmental
structures today, including policymaking by private parties. The leading
doctrines for addressing the constitutionality of private lawmaking-the
nondelegation and Chevron doctrines-resolve that tension by reference to
express or presumed congressional intent. A private subdelegation
doctrine should likewise confine policymaking to the political branches of
government unless Congress expressly authorizes private sector
rulemaking.
Development of a subdelegation doctrine is sensible for several
reasons. First, the Constitution's separation of powers embodies a
recognition that, "without th[e] check of judicial review, agencies could
essentially become judges of their own cases, which the framers clearly
opposed. 29 6 To be constitutionally permissible, therefore, delegation
requires judicial review.297 Yet judicial review requires legislative
standards. Even under the lax intelligible principle test, the Court has
adhered to the notion that a total "absence of standards for the guidance of
[an agency's] action, so that it would be impossible in a proper proceeding
to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed," is
unconstitutional.29 8 If Congress authorizes an agency to make policy under

296. Garry, supra note 194, at 946 n. 163. "If the [rulemaking] process is nothing but a massive
delegation of government authority to the private sector, then judicial policing of the outcomes is
vital." Herz, supra note 164, at 367.
297. Herz, supra note 164, at 367 ("The strenuousness of review should be tied to the risk of
illegality, which is especially high . . . when there is the momentum of stakeholder consensus
supporting a particular outcome.").
298. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (stating that Congress cannot "provide[] literally no guidance for the
exercise of discretion"); cf Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)) (intemal quotation marks omitted) (noting that the Court has
"almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law").
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a particular statute, the agency's power is limited to what Congress allows
it to do. If Congress does not authorize agencies to subdelegate
governmental authority to the private sector, or if it fails to provide
statutory boundaries to govern the private exercise of that authority, courts
cannot meaningfully exercise judicial review. Without legislative
authorization, agencies' decisions to outsource their policymaking powers
are constitutionally infirm.
Second, a subdelegation doctrine would enforce the existing
presumption that, for the nondelegation doctrine to work, Congress must
delegate to particularized recipients. Just as the nondelegation doctrine is
confined to delegations by Congress, the intelligible principle standard
only applies to delegations to particular executive branch agencies. The
doctrine assumes that congressionally-delegated authority is exclusive to
the agency specifically identified in a statute. This is why, say, the Federal
Trade Commission cannot promulgate environmental or labor laws with
the force of law-those tasks are delegated to the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Department of Labor, respectively. In Mistretta
v. United States, the Court explained that a delegation is "constitutionally
sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public
agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated
authority. ' '299 The Third Circuit has likewise construed the intelligible
principle test as requiring "that Congress identify the recipient of the
delegated authority." 300 Given that private parties are less democratically
accountable than federal agencies-and thus more structurally attenuated
from Congress itself-it makes little sense to preclude the Federal Trade
Commission from issuing securities regulations while allowing the
regulated industry to issue such regulations at the behest of the Securities
Exchange Commission. Moving from accountable government agents to
unaccountable private ones deflects from democratic decisionmaking,
which is at the heart of the constitutional requirement that Congress
delegate intelligible principles.
Third, a subdelegation doctrine would ensure that Congress's
constitutionally protected power remains in the hands of the legislative
branch. In the words of Justice Kagan and Judge Barron, "[a]ll the
constitutional structure suggests is that Congress has control over the
allocation of authority to resolve statutory ambiguity., 30 ' This idea finds
support in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass 'ns, in which Justice Scalia
299. 488 U.S. at 372-73 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
300. United States v. Cooper, 750 F.3d 263, 272 (3d Cir. 2014).
301. Barron & Kagan, supra note 292, at 222.
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wrote a majority opinion upholding the CAA's delegation of power to the
EPA to promulgate national ambient air quality standards that "are
requisite to protect the public health., 30 2 Because the text of Article I
"permits no delegation of [legislative] powers," he explained, "Congress
must 'lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform. 303 He rejected
the suggestion that "an agency can cure an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of
the statute. ' ,3 04 An agency cannot "declin[e] to exercise some of that
power" it was delegated. 30 5 That choice-"that is to say, the prescription
of the standard that Congress had omitted-would itself be an exercise of
the forbidden legislative authority. 30 6 Justices Thomas and Stevens each
wrote separately to take issue with whether legislative power per se is
delegable, but effectively agreed that Congress holds the reigns when it
comes to delegating policymaking
authority-and must retain that hold in
30 7
its enabling legislation.
If agencies cannot decline to exercise delegated power, it follows that
they cannot unilaterally decide to give that power to a private third party,
either. To be sure, in his concurring opinion in Whitman, Justice Stevens
read the Vesting Clauses as devoid of express delegation limits. 30 8 Yet his
analysis is consistent with the majority's view that it is Congress's
prerogative to dictate the terms whereby-and by whom-a statute is
implemented. 30 9 The legislative power is vested in the Congress, a political
branch of government. Thus, only Congress can decide whether extraconstitutional actors may exercise that power.

302. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 465 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(I)).
303. Id. at 472 (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,409 (1928)).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 473.
306. Id.
307. Justice Thomas complained that the Constitution itself contains no reference to "intelligible
principles," and warned of a "delegated decision [that] is simply too great for the decision to be called
anything other than 'legislative."' Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring). For his part, Justice Stevens
urged "frank[] acknowledg[ement] that the power delegated to the EPA is 'legislative,"' but reasoned
that it is nevertheless "constitutional because [it is] adequately limited by the terms of the authorizing
statute." Id. at 488 (Stevens, J., concurring). Refusing to "pretend, as the Court does, that the authority
delegated . . . is somehow not 'legislative power,"' he argued that nothing in the Vesting Clauses
"purport[s] to limit the authority of either recipient of power to delegate authority to others." Id. at
488-89. "Surely," he reasoned, "the authority granted to members of the Cabinet and federal law
enforcement agents is properly characterized as 'Executive' even though not exercised by the
President." Id. at 489.
308. Id. at 489 (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 752 (1986)).
309. See id. at 472 ("Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies
").
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Fourth, agency subdelegations of legislative power to private parties
raise conflict-of-interest concerns of constitutional weight, which do not
exist when Congress or federal agencies make policy on their own. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the coercive power of private
interests is antithetical to the legislative function under the Constitution. In
Schechter Poultry, the government argued that the NIRA provisions in
question were constitutional because the privately-drafted codes the statute
authorized would "consist of rules of competition deemed fair for each
industry by representative members of that industry-by the persons most
vitally concerned and most familiar with its problems."31 The Court
rejected this argument on the rationale that it is not Congress's role to
support the objectives of private industry, which is inherently biased:
"would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its
legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to
empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for
the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? '311 The Court
deemed it "obvious" that "[s]uch a delegation ...[would be] utterly
inconsistent3 12 with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of
Congress."
313
the Court cast its concern over selfIn Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
interested private regulators in due process terms. It drew a "fundamental"
distinction "between producing coal and regulating its production" under
the statute at issue in Carter,with "[t]he former . . . a private activity" and
"the latter . . . necessarily a governmental function, since, in the very
nature of things, one person may not be entrusted with the power to
regulate the business of another, and especially of a competitor., 31 4 Hence,
the Court reasoned, "a statute which attempts to confer such power
undertakes an intolerable and unconstitutional interference with personal
liberty and private property," rendering "[t]he delegation ...a denial of
rights safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 3 5

310. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
314. Id. at 311.
315. Id.; see also Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 584 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A
potential conflict arises ... whenever government delegates licensing power to private parties whose
economic interests may be served by limiting the number of competitors who may engage in a
particular trade."); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICAAN to Route Around
the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 153 (2000) (stating that the private delegation doctrine
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The Carter Court's nod to due process has yet to rematerialize in
private delegation doctrine. 1 6 Yet the notion that private parties'
inevitable drive to regulate for their own benefit and at the expense of
competitors and/or the public applies with even greater force to agency
subdelegations of regulatory authority to the private sector. The logic of
Carter accordingly suggests that, at a minimum, agency decisions to
outsource regulatory power to private industry should be grounded in
express legislative authorization.
Thus, by enabling judicial review of agency decisions to subdelegate
legislative power to private parties, a subdelegation doctrine would serve
the separation of powers in a manner that is entirely consistent with the
longstanding, congressionally-focused approach to nondelegation.
Likewise, as described below, Chevron should be applied to require that
agencies exercise their rulemaking powers in a manner that adheres to
legislative intent-including when they outsource delegated functions to
the private sector.
B. Chevron Step Zero
Absent a private subdelegation doctrine, Chevron represents the sole
mechanism for judicial oversight of what Judge Posner of the Seventh
Circuit has called the "abdication of regulatory authority to the regulated,
the full burgeoning of the interest-group state, and the final confirmation
of the 'capture' theory of administrative regulation. 3t 7 Under the APA,
regulators can freely communicate with the regulated community and
other interest groups in the rulemaking process, enabling affected parties
to invest in the final product at its nascent stages. 318 This Article does not
advocate for additional procedural encumbrances on the rulemaking
"is, in fact, rooted in a prohibition against self-interested regulation"); Lawrence, supra note 228, at
659.
316. It is one of the issues the Court identified for consideration by the D.C. Circuit on remand in
Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015).

The D.C. Circuit ruled on this matter on April 29,2016, reversing the ruling of the lower court, finding
that the PRIIA violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause by "authorizing an economically
self-interested actor to regulate its competitors," and the Appointments Clause by "delegating
regulatory power to an improperly appointed arbitrator." Ass'n of Am. R.R.s v. Dep't of Transp., No.
12-5204, slip op. at 3 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 29, 2016). The court declined to reach the question ofwhether "a
government corporation whose board is only partially comprised of members appointed by the
President [is] constitutionally eligible to exercise regulatory power." Id.
317. USA Grp. Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714 (7th Cir. 1996).
318. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(recognizing "Congress' intent not to prohibit or require disclosure of all ex parte contacts during or
after the public comment stage" of informal rulemakings under the APA).
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process, which can frustrate legislative objectives and foster inefficiencies.
It asserts, rather, that courts should reclaim their role of "say[ing] what the
law is"'319 to account for the private sector's increasing influence in the

rulemaking process.
To restate the basics, Chevron's two-part test holds that if statutory
language is clear under step one, Congress did not delegate policymaking
authority in the first instance. This step ensures fidelity to statutory
parameters, the structural Constitution, and the judicial prerogative of
upholding the rule of law. Delegation occurs only when statutory
ambiguity exists. 320 If agencies issue rules with the force of law pursuant
to such ambiguity, their policymaking receives deference under step two.
No deference occurs, however, if an agency is not acting in a way that
operates as a substitute for the legislative process. 321 The Court has stated
that "[i]t is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates
administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a
relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness
and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force. 322
For administrative actions that are less formal than notice and comment or
formal rulemakings, judges must search for congressional authorization
for agencies to make policy with the force of law.3 23 Specifically, courts
conduct a "step zero" analysis to determine if Congress intended the
agency to receive policymaking deference by virtue of processes that are
not grounded in express statutory authorization.
Because deference runs-if at all--only to agencies to which Congress
delegates rulemaking authority, the Court should construe Chevron step
zero to decline deference to rules that reflect policy crafted by the private
sector.324 In this way, step zero would function to replace the
nondelegation doctrine's role in preserving structural safeguards under the
Constitution when public power is exercised along the right side of the
constitutional policymaking continuum. Alternatively, courts should apply

319. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

320. Cass Sunstein has thus called Chevron a prodelegation canon. Cass R. Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 329-30 (2000).

321. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 218, 229 (2001).
322. Id. at 230.
323. See Garry, supra note 194, at 956.
324. If this element were incorporated into the Chevron analysis, agencies would be incentivized
to include in the administrative record facts demonstrating how the policy reflected in the final rule
was crafted. Cf Damien M. Schiff, Sackett v. EPA: Compliance Orders and the Right of Judicial

Review, 2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 113, 136 ("When the agency knew that it could not be hailed into
court for its compliance orders, it had no incentive to shore up its administrative record; now that such
a result is possible, the EPA has a real incentive to do its homework before acting.").
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Chevron step one to construe legislative silence as precluding agency
authority to delegate policymaking to the public sector in response to the
"broader criticism of the growth and power of the modem administrative
state-e.g., that Congress has lost control through the nondelegation
325
doctrine, and that courts have lost control through Chevron."
In reverting to a search for congressional intent, step zero replaces
nondelegation's role in preserving the Constitution's structural safeguards,
including its retention of policymaking power in the most democratic
branch of government: the legislature. If there is a clear legislative
mandate as to how a particular statute should be implemented, Chevron
requires judicial review of the resulting regulation in order to ensure
agency adherence to congressional intent. If there is no such legislative
mandate or an agency uses a less formal process to make policy, step zero
holds agencies accountable within the boundaries of their delegated
authority by enabling courts to ultimately clarify what the law is when
agencies do not exercise authority to make policy with the force of law.326
When rulemaking is conducted largely by the private sector, "the need
for careful judicial scrutiny is particularly appropriate due to . . .the

potential for collusion among those who are present to distort statutory
terms. 327 In the typical notice and comment process, "[b]usiness oriented
groups overwhelm an 'overstretched' agency staff with '[a] continuous
barrage of letters, telephone calls, meetings, follow-up memoranda, formal
comments, post-rule comments, petitions for reconsideration, and notices
of appeal.' 328 The agency takes these inputs into consideration in
formulating policy in drafts of legislative rules or nonlegislative guidance.
"[I]f most of the information submitted to an agency reflects an industry
view of regulatory issues," however, "regulators are likely to be overinfluenced by this experience, leading them to form generalizations that
undermine their capacity to visualize other policy alternatives. 3 9
Psychological studies suggest that "people are subject to an availability
heuristic, which causes them to overestimate the probability of events

325. Garry, supra note 194, at 946 n.163.
326. This is so even if Skidmore deference-which affords courts discretion as to whether to take
into account an agency's policymaking choices-applies. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
139-40 (1944).

327.
328.

Choo, supra note 64, at 1071.
Shapiro, supra note 294, at 238 (quoting Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter

Failure,and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J.1321, 1325 (2010)).

329.

Id.
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based on the information most immediately available to them. 330 Thus,
agency personnel are prone to adhere to the policy alternatives that they
accept at the outset of a rulemaking. Judicial review serves to counteract
such actual or perceived bias that may be embodied in a final rule at the
expense of broader public interests reflected in the plain language of the
statute.
Absent robust judicial review, moreover, agencies can "effectively turn
their backs on their statutory mandates" by outsourcing their rulemaking
functions. 331 In negotiated rulemaking-a close cousin of the type of
private sector policymaking embodied in the Cpp 332 --"agencies try at
times to cajole warring outside interest groups into signing off on
compromises that are not legally, much less technically, appropriate. 333
As a consequence, "[i]ssues of statutory construction [a]re resolved more
through a process of political bargaining than disinterested legal reasoning
or expertise[,] .

.

.contrary to Chevron's intent. 334 Agencies function as

"mere participants" in the rulemaking process, and no longer manifest the
expertise rationale for Chevron deference.335 Negotiated rules can thus "no
longer be presumed to reflect either the agency's own expertise or choice
' 336
of the 'best' policy, based on instrumentally rational decisionmaking.
Courts have declined to apply Chevron deference when the record fails to
reflect how an agency employed its own expertise in making a policy
decision.337

330. Id. (citing SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 121
(1993)).
331. Rena Steinzor & Scott Strauss, Building a Consensus: Agencies Stressing 'Reg Neg'
Approach, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 3, 1987, at 21.
332. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 authorizes agencies to bring interested parties
together to draft a proposed rule. Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994)). Congress has also specifically directed certain agencies to engage in
negotiated rulemaking. See Choo, supra note 64, at 1074 n.30 (compiling statutes).
333. Steinzor & Strauss, supranote 331, at 21.
334. Choo, supra note 64, at 1097.
335. /d
336. Id.
337. See Keyspan-Ravenswood, LLC v. FERC, 474 F.3d 804, 812 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (observing
that "[w]e will defer to the Commission's judgment in technical matters within its expertise, but only
when the Commission has in fact exercised its judgment," and finding that agency did not warrant
deference with respect to economic analysis); Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Tyson, 796 F.2d
1479, 1505 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (refusing to defer to agency finding regarding short-term chemical
exposure in the work place); see also Choo, supra note 64, at 1102 (arguing that resulting regulations
"carry particularly questionable democratic legitimacy, and courts should not exacerbate this problem
by extending Chevron deference to them"); cf Cent. Arizona Water Conservation Dist. v. EPA, 990
F.3d 1531, 1540 n.8 (9th Cir. 1993) (observing that "the 'expertise model' does not necessarily
mandate judicial deference").
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Private sector rulemaking undermines the democratic rationale for
Chevron deference to the extent that it produces rules that fail to serve the
public interest. If rules drafters are not neutral, expert, or detached in the
same way as public officials are presumed to be, "law becomes nothing
more than the expression of private interests mediated through some
governmental body., 338 Agency rulemaking loses its public interest
objective,33 9 subtly transforming public law into a set of "private law
relationships., 340 "[C]ourts can no longer presume that regulations
formulated through private interest group bargaining embody either the
agency's conception of the public interest, or an application of legal,
technical, or policy expertise that is worthy of judicial deference. 3 4'
Outsourced rulemaking is even more problematic than negotiated
rulemaking because only a subset of interests is represented in the drafting
process.
With government policymaking becoming more privatized, doctrine
must develop to counteract courts' tendency to apply Chevron "without
regard to a rule's negotiated origins. 3 42 Just as step zero requires courts to
determine the level of deference to afford policymaking that is not
grounded in express statutory authorization, step zero should operate to
sort out whether policymaking that results from agencies' unilateral
subdelegations to the private sector should receive judicial deference.
Because private sector policymaking does not itself bear the characteristics
of government action that Congress intended to have the force of law, it
should not receive deference under Chevron step zero.
The scant Supreme Court cases amounting to the step zero canon shore
up the conclusion that agency policymaking should not receive Chevron
deference to the extent that it derives from substantial private sector
influence. In United States v. Mead Corp., the Court refused to apply
Chevron deference to letter rulings made by forty-six offices of the US
Customs Service because they did not "bespeak the legislative type of
343
activity that would naturally bind more than the parties to the ruling.
The tariff classifications applied only to the particular importers to whom
they were issued. 344 The Court justified its decision not to apply Chevron
338. William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the
Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1375 (1997).
339. Choo, supra note 64, at 1100.
340. Funk, supra note 338, at 1386.
341. Choo, supra note 64, at 1071.
342. Id. at 1081.
343. 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001).
344. Id. at 233.
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by broadly referencing "the great variety of ways in which the laws invest
the Government's administrative arms with discretion, and 345with
procedures for exercising it, in giving meaning to Acts of Congress.
The private sector's influence on bureaucratic policymaking likewise
demands review of notice and comment rulemakings that is grounded in
congressional intent. In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,346
the Court denied the FDA Chevron deference despite a seemingly broad
grant of rulemaking authority. Finding that Congress did not delegate to
the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco as a drug, the Court invalidated
a regulation painstakingly promulgated by notice and comment. "[N]o
matter how important, conspicuous, and controversial the issue, and
regardless of how likely the public is to hold the Executive Branch
politically accountable," the Court reasoned, "an administrative agency's
power to regulate in the public interest must always be grounded in a valid
grant of authority from Congress. '347 The "common sense" that guided the
Court in Brown & Williamson "as to the manner in which Congress is
likely to delegate a policy decision of . . . economic and political
magnitude to an administrative agency" '348 virtually forecloses the
possibility that Congress ever means to impliedly delegate lawmaking
power to private parties.
In Barnhart v. Walton,34 9 the Court applied additional factors in the
step zero analysis in affording Chevron deference to the Social Security
Administration's denial of disability benefits. The Court looked to "the
related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to
administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the
careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period
of time" to conclude that the agency's interpretation of the underlying
statute fell within its "lawful" interpretative authority. 350 The Barnhart
factors thus justify deference only where the rationales underlying
Chevron itself exist (i.e., studious consideration of longstanding policy
questions within a particular agency's expertise).
These factors hardly apply to agency rulemakings that are conducted
by the private sector. If the propriety of deference is framed as a question
of congressional intent under Chevron, deference can only run to an
at 236.
345. Id.
346. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
347. Id. at 161 (internal quotation marks omitted).
348.
349.

Id.at 133.
535 U.S. 212 (2002).

350. Id. at 217, 222.
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executive branch agency. Congress cannot be presumed to defer to private
sector expertise when a statute delegates rulemaking power to government
actors. Nor can courts reasonably conclude under Barnhartthat Congress
intended for longstanding agency rulemaking practices to be supplanted by
the successful lobbying efforts of particular non-governmental actors. Just
as the Customs decisions in Mead were not without consideration of all
affected interests in mind, policymaking derived from private influence is
a poor proxy for the generalized, representative decision-making that the
most democratic branch of government-Congress-is designed to
produce. Private parties function without transparency and out of selfinterest rather than in service of the broader public good. As such,
rulemaking driven by special interests should not have the same binding
effect as policymaking that germinates within the constitutional structure
of government.
Under step zero, therefore, Chevron deference should be conditioned
on a finding that agency officials-and not the private sector-made the
policy reflected in a regulation. For rules drafted in the first instance by
private actors, courts should employ de novo review for consistency with
legislative objectives. The Court has already carved out exceptions to
Chevron deference (e.g., agency lawyers do not get deference for
arguments made in the course of litigation); 311 private sector rulemaking
could simply be added to this list.35
Moreover, in order to trigger a Chevron deference analysis under step
zero, agencies would by necessity include in the administrative record
information regarding the drafting process-much like they construct the
administrative record with an eye towards arbitrary and capricious
review.3 53 Courts would then determine if a rule embodies a policy deal
struck between an agency and certain interest groups to the exclusion of
others.3 54 If the record fails to demonstrate that a rulemaking was driven
351.

See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228, 238 n.19 (2001); Bowen v. Georgetown

Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988).

352. Cf Choo, supra note 64, at 1085, 1087 (making the same point regarding negotiated
rulemaking, and noting that the architect of negotiated rulemaking had argued that there should be
little to no judicial review of the results).
353. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971). Although the
Supreme Court held in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 435

U.S. 519 (1978), that courts cannot add procedural requirements to the APA, the D.C. Circuit has held
that Vermont Yankee is not inconsistent with Overton Park's requirement that, "in order to allow for
meaningful judicial review, the agency must produce an administrative record that delineates the path
by which it reached its decision." Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.3d 325, 338-39 (D.C.

Cir. 1989). The same analysis would apply here.
354. See Seidenfeld, supra note 283, at 457 n.199.
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by internal agency expertise rather than private sector influence, the result
would simply be less deference to the policy contained in the final rule.
Agencies could decide for themselves whether to limit ex parte influence
in the rulemaking process or establish a more inclusive, collaborative
process in order to avoid more stringent judicial review. By bolstering
judicial review for such considerations, step zero would tie rulemakings
back to Congress's intent in delegating power to an agency in the first
instance. This is, at bottom, a decision about "which political branch will
'
have the authority to control the outcome of an issue."355
Courts could alternatively confine subdelegations of policymaking to
the private sector under step one of the Chevron analysis by finding what
Lisa Shultz Bressman calls "clarity in ambiguity. ' 356 Chevron's
congressional intent rationale assumes that Congress understands that, in
transferring policymaking power to the executive branch, it protects its
own interests by virtue of the fiscal, statutory, and constitutional oversight
mechanisms that apply to federal agencies. Such checks do not apply to
the private sector. Thus, even if it is appropriate to infer congressional
intent to defer to agency policymaking from vague statutory language,
ambiguity does not necessarily translate into deference to policymaking
conducted by private parties that an agency unilaterally imports into the
rulemaking process. In fact, the opposite inference-no deference-should
apply if Congress is silent regarding the propriety of private sector
influence. In other words, "[b]y denying agencies the discretion to
interpret ambiguous terms as they see fit, the Court effectively may block
the delegation of policymaking authority. 357 In AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utilities Board, the Supreme Court struck down an agency interpretation
under Chevron step two on the rationale that it lacked "some limiting
standard, rationally related to the goals of the [statute]. 358 Likewise,
absent an indication of congressional intent that agencies may defer to
factions of the private sector in rulemakings, it would be up to the
judiciary to fill gaps in legislative policy.
To be sure, it is difficult-if not impossible-to accurately discern the
extent to which private sector influence impacts routine notice and
comment rulemakings; the empirical evidence regarding the very existence
355. Ku, supranote 160, at 140; see also Schwarcz, supra note 107, at 338.
356. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millenium: A Delegation Doctrine for the
Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J.1399, 1411 (2000).

357. Id. at 1412.
358. 525 U.S. 366, 388-89 (1999).
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of regulatory capture is mixed.35 9 Scholars have nonetheless urged more
public transparency regarding the extent of industry influence in
rulemakings to test their fidelity to legislative directives. 360 Mead's
"unstructured, case-by-case inquiry into whether deference to an agency
interpretation
'makes best sense' provides a platform for such judicial
36
review.

1

C. Baseline Values Revisited
The Court has stood by the foundational premise that the Constitution's
structure forbids the respective branches from delegating a certain subset
of their federal powers to any other entity. A formalist reading of the
Vesting Clauses thus leaves scant leeway for the exercise of legislative
power outside the boundaries of the Constitution.3 6 2 As a practical matter,
the Court has instead taken a functional approach to separation of powers
doctrine, including nondelegation and Chevron. Similarly, a functional
approach to constitutional structure supports a framework for analysis of
subdelegations of legislative authority to the private sector even though,
from a formalist perspective, the private sector is beyond the
Constitution's reach.
Specifically, a private subdelegation doctrine and expanded application
of Chevron step zero would bring private lawmaking within the ambit of
legal and political oversight that applies to government actors, enabling
courts to reclaim their role of policing delegations of vested constitutional
power.363 As explained below, such doctrinal shifts would relieve the
strain on core values underlying the Constitution's design that privatized
lawmaking creates.3

1. Accountability
This Article has argued that courts should construe Chevron step zero
as denying deference to rules that embody private sector constructions of
ambiguous statutory language. By tethering deference to a particular
agency specified in an enabling statute, such an approach would promote

359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

Barron & Kagan, supra note 292, at 239-40.
See id at 253.
Id. at 225.
Krent, supra note 228, at 68.
Ku, supra note 160, at 77.
This Article makes no claims as to the normative value of outsourcing policymaking to the

private sector.
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"accountable and disciplined decision making, in much the way ' the
365
congressional nondelegation doctrine is meant to do in another context.
The Constitution sets forth a procedural framework for the definition
and allocation of the people's power to self-govern. People accept the
Constitution because it establishes a "specifically constituted,
democratically deliberative lawmaking system to which all primary legal
content is constantly accountable." 366 It assumes that voters can identify
which branch and which government actor is responsible for a particular
action. When rulemaking functions are outsourced by contract or via
informal lobbying efforts, government actors abdicate their constitutional
responsibilities, leaving the public without democratically accountable
actors in core policymaking roles.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected politicians' attempts to
shirk responsibility for policymaking by handing it off to other entities and
muddying lines of accountability. 367 In Printz v. United States,3 68 Justice
Scalia wrote for the Court that "[t]he Constitution ...contemplates that a
State's government will represent and remain accountable to its own
citizens., 369 Because the Brady hand gun statute allowed Congress to
evade public accountability for its effects, Congress could take credit for
"'solving' problems" related to handguns without raising federal taxes,
while at the same time putting states "in the position of taking the blame
for its burdensomeness and for its defects., 370 As the Court elsewhere
explained, "where the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the
accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished. 3 7' So, too,
where agencies subdelegate policymaking power to private actors, lines of
political accountability are blurred. The unavailability of judicial review
exacerbates this problem.
A private subdelegation doctrine would enhance government
accountability by empowering courts to confine outsourcing of legislativetype functions and require that policymaking retain its democratic
365. Barron & Kagan, supra note 292, at 238, 241. Justice Kagan and Judge Barron have
accordingly argued that Chevron should apply only if "statutory delegetes" make policy decisions. Id.
at 236, 237 (defining statutory delegate as "the officer to whom the agency's organic statute has
granted authority over a given administrative action," often the secretary of the department).
366. Frank I. Michelman, W(h)ither the Constitution?, 21 CARDOZo L. REV. 1063, 1071 (2000).
367. See Brown, supra note 110, at 1379-80 (discussing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), among others).
368. 521 U.S. 898.
369. Id. at 920 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 57677 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
370. ldat930.
371. New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
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moorings. Likewise, by deferring to courts' reading of legislative
ambiguity over that of unrepresentative segments of the private sector, a
revised approach to Chevron step zero would enhance democratic
accountability. Agencies would be forced to make public the process by
which rules are drafted-and by whom--enabling candid debate over the
propriety of agencies' decisions to adopt private sector policy objectives.
Unilateral decisions to employ democratically unaccountable actors to
make policy would thus finally be subject to judicial review.
2. Transparency
Accounting for private sector influence in judicial review of agency
policymaking would also enhance public transparency. To be sure,
agencies can engage in ex parte discussions when they make policy under
the APA.372 The President can also select or reject his advisors without
external oversight. 373 Inherent in his constitutional role is an "executive
privilege" to keep certain information secret "among governmental
employees., 37 4 But there is a difference between "closely-held executive
deliberations" and "public dialogue" about policies affecting the populace
at large.375 In Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm 'n, the Court
acknowledged the constitutional importance of transparent government,
explaining that "transparency enables the electorate to make informed
decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.''37f
For Congress's part, the FACA recognizes the importance of imposing
transparency requirements on certain policy forums within the executive
branch.377 In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Court explained
that "the meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts,
372. Approximately eighty-six percent of interest groups contact agency staff informally before a
proposed rule is published in the Federal Register. Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 22, at 362-63.
373. See Gia B. Lee, The President's Secrets, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 242 (2008)
(questioning whether presidential confidentiality leads to better decision-making, notwithstanding "the
structural features of presidential decision making-including the centralization of presidential
decision making in a single individual, the hierarchical organization of the President and his advisors,
and the President's discretion to select only advisors that share his views").
374. See Dannenmaier, supranote 155, at 334, 344 (citing McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d 1278,
1287 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1974) (recognizing
executive privilege against public disclosure of "communications between high Government officials
and those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties" and that "[t]he
President's need for complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the
courts").
375. Dannenmaier, supranote 155, at 335.
376. 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010).
377. 5 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-16(2014).
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particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more
specifically to the topic at hand., 378 An approach to Chevron step zero that
embraces judicial review of the process by which agencies draft policy for
consistency with congressional prerogatives to delegate to executive
branch agencies is consistent with the legislative objectives underlying the
FACA, which the Court has described as "opening many advisory
relationships to public scrutiny except in certain narrowly defined
situations. 37 9 Under current statutory and constitutional doctrine, private
sector influence over the rulemaking process occurs largely in the
shadows. Judicial application of Chevron step zero to effectively require
agencies to make public the extent to which they have allowed private
parties to exercise congressionally-delegated policymaking functions
would further the FACA's legislative objective, which mirrors the
Constitution's implicit valuing of open government.
3. Legitimacy
Additionally, the development of a subdelegation doctrine and a
reading of Chevron step zero as enabling judicial scrutiny of private sector
influence in the rulemaking process would enhance government legitimacy
in at least three ways: by making rulemaking more inclusive, by lessening
bias in the regulatory process, and by tethering agency lawmaking to
constitutional structures.
First, judicial review of private sector influence on rulemaking would
render final rules more democratically inclusive. Legitimacy in agency
rulemaking derives from the authorizing statute and the process for
developing rules, including public participation. Public participation
functions as "a substitute for the electoral process that bestows
constitutional legitimacy on legislation." 380 It also informs lawmakers
about what policy outcome is in the public interest. For these reasons,
policymaking is democratically legitimate only if it is inclusive; otherwise,
there is no reason to prefer agency decisionmaking to that of federal
judges who, despite having "no constituency" and functioning outside
"either political branch of the government,' 381 operate with political
independence by virtue of their life tenure and salary protections.3 82
378. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 121 (2000).
379. Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 463 (1989).
380. Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 22, at 354.
381. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
382. Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionalityof Bush v. Gore, 82
B.U. L. REv. 609, 659 (2002) ("The apparent purpose of the life-tenure provision of Article Ill is to
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Inclusiveness is also embedded in the legislative objectives of the APA
itself. The statute's legislative history indicates that "[i]n the 'rule making'
(that is, 'legislative') function[,] with certain exceptions, agencies must
publish notice and at least permit interested parties to submit their views in
writing for agency consideration before the issuance of general
regulations. 3 8 3 Indeed, a contemporary scholar remarked eight years after
the APA's passage that the law "was the culmination of a generation of
effort on the part of students of American administrative law who felt that
administrative power was ... not
sufficiently safeguarded and sometimes
384
put to arbitrary and biased use.,
Second, judicial construction of interstitial gaps in legislation is more
legitimate than private sector policymaking because private parties are
beholden to their own stakeholders' interests. Legitimacy "relies on the
notion that value judgments are made by [government] policy makers, and
that managers and street-level workers are only implementing the
policy., 385 With outsourcing, "the government is not only purchasing
services but also 'purchasing' private sector logic and ethos in service
delivery" (i.e., "market culture and values").386 Sometimes private
interests converge with those of the public, but sometimes they do not. To
the extent that private parties operate out of self-interest, rulemakings that
are heavily influenced by factions of the private sector lack the legitimacy
of exclusively governmental lawmaking. 387 By applying principled canons
and rule of law values to private lawmaking, courts can impose the
"distributional goals" '388 that APA rulemaking is designed to serve.
Third, unlike private parties, federal judges derive legitimacy from the
formal constitutional structures that establish the federal courts within the
separation of powers. 389 Legitimacy assumes that those exercising public
ensure the political independence of the federal judiciary.").
383. S.REP. No. 79-752, at 193 (1945).
384. Bernard Schwartz, The Administrative ProcedureAct in Operation, 2 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173,
1173 (1954); see also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 26

(1947).
385. Benish, supra note 130, at 6.
386. Id. at 7.
387. See Schwarcz, supra note 107, at 338; Funk, supra note 125, at 94 (arguing that negotiated
rulemaking undermines the public interest and the legitimacy of administrative action); cf Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578 (1973) (holding that members of the Alabama Board of Optometry had a
pecuniary interest that constitutionally disqualified them from passing on charges of unprofessional
conduct by competitors).
388. Schwarcz, supra note 107, at 322.
389. Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and
Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 371 (1990).
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to make binding rules."'3 90 When the executive

branch departs from the Constitution's structure by outsourcing
constitutionally derived functions, the government's overall legitimacy is
reduced.39' The private sector has no independent source of power to
affect the general population. By confining the exercise of the people's
power to constitutionally vested branches of government, a private
subdelegation doctrine and invigoration of Chevron step zero to account
for private sector lawmaking would greatly enhance legitimacy.
4. RationalDecisionmaking
Finally, by counteracting the incentives of private industry to formulate
policy that is self-serving and suboptimal for the public as a whole,
enhanced judicial review of private influence on rulemakings would foster
rational decisionmaking in government.
A common thread in public choice theory is an assumption that "[t]he
individual will order his behavior so as to maximize the likelihood of
achieving his individually defined goals., 392 Private interest groups or
lobbyists will accordingly push for regulatory policies that advance the
financial interests of their constituents, with insufficient regard for the
welfare of the public at large. 93 Unlike Congress as a whole, individual
bureaucrats are not constitutionally bound to publicly reach a measure of
consensus. They are more vulnerable to influence by private interests than
a collective Congress. When a private party is tasked with giving content
to a rule, therefore, public power is subverted in furtherance of "private
wealth
gain with a net loss in aggregate welfare and/or unjustifiable
394 The result is bad government. 395
groups.,,
transfers between
By tying private sector policymaking to statutory language that reflects
the consensus of a bicameral legislature, a subdelegation doctrine and
revised approach to Chevron step zero would counteract selfinterestedness, thus fostering government decisionmaking that better
serves the broader populace.396 The Supreme Court has characterized

390.

DAHL, supra note 161, at 41; see also Bodansky, supra note 161, at 601 n.29.

391. Ku, supra note 160, at 127, 129 (noting that self-regulatory regimes derive some legitimacy
from their respective constituencies).
392. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 563 (2002).

393.
394.
395.
396.

Id. at 568.
Id. at 570.
Id.
See id. at 569.
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disinterestedness in government as having deep-seated normative
implications. In Young v. United States,397 it reversed a conviction for
criminal contempt because it was secured by private lawyers appointed by
the court. The Court explained that a private party might prosecute a weak
case or pass over a strong one if either course "promises financial or legal
rewards for the private client., 398 Like federal prosecutors, agencies are
"the representative[s] ... of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest [is] ... that justice shall be done. ' 399 Allowing regulated entities to
occupy a privileged position in the rulemaking process undermines this
goal. Because "[p]ublic confidence in . . . disinterested conduct . . . is
essential" when "expansive powers and wide-ranging discretion" are
400
involved,
shouldand
be disinterested
given the doctrinal
tools to address private
sector impactcourts
on rational
policymaking.
CONCLUSION

This Article has urged the expansion of the nondelegation and Chevron
doctrines to account for the private end of the constitutional policymaking
continuum it describes. To the extent that executive branch agencies either
contractually outsource or informally insource policy decisions formulated
by factions of the private sector, courts should review the nature and scope
of such influence to ensure compatibility with congressional intent and to
foster constitutional norms of good government.
To be sure, private sector influence on agency rulemakings is so well
entrenched in the modem federal bureaucracy that any attempt to fashion
mechanisms for judicial review will be met with suspicious reluctance.
The line between legitimate lobbying and constitutionally grounded
policymaking is difficult to identify. Courts would have to develop the
doctrine incrementally over time. Through its functionalist approach to
delegation doctrine, the Court has long acknowledged the impracticalities
of cabining legislative power to the precise terms of Article I's Vesting
Clause. Expanding existing doctrine to capture private lawmaking is of a
piece with the pragmatic spirit of the Court's existing separation of powers
jurisprudence. Private lawmaking, in short, has inescapable constitutional
implications that currently evade democratic and judicial scrutiny. The
397.
398.
399.
400.

481 U.S. 787 (1987).
Id. at 805.
Id. at 803 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
Id. at 813.
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development of a private subdelegation doctrine and a more nuanced
approach to Chevron step zero would begin to address this constitutional
blind spot, thus holding out important public law values-public
accountability, transparency, legitimacy, and rational decisionmaking-as
more important than notions of agency prerogative.

